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 Farrell 1 
Introduction 
The current international political system was born out of centuries of war in Europe, 
extended to the rest of the world during the colonial and imperial eras, and inherited by the 
United States following the conclusion of World War II. Using its economic and military 
influence, the United States made a variety of commitments to its allies around the world, 
creating an institutionalized structure for international relations known as the global liberal order. 
The end of the Cold War reinforced the United States’ role as the world’s dominant political, 
economic, and military power. For many observers, the Cold War’s conclusion solidified the 
credibility of the American vision of global order. As a result, theories of a unipolar world 
centered on U.S interests and upheld by the hegemony of the United States have become more 
popular since the fall of the Soviet Union. In 2004, Charles Krauthammer, an influential 
American conservative, stated that “on December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union died and something 
new was born… a unipolar world dominated by a single superpower unchecked by any rival and 
with decisive reach in every corner of the world. This is a staggering development in history, not 
seen since the fall of Rome”. 1 Just one year after Krauthammer’s exclamation of U.S. 
unipolarity, a survey from the Economist titled “the New Titans” reported that the developing 
countries made up more than half of the world’s total GDP.2  The rise of international actors that 
are not traditional stakeholders in the international political system constructed by the United 
States has called into question what this development will mean for the future of global politics. 
The emerging economies of developing nations suggest that the world, in economic terms, is 
heading towards multipolarity, despite assumptions that the post-Cold War era is singularly 
                                                        
1 Charles Krauthammer, “An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World,” Speech, Irving Kristol Lecture, 
American Enterprise Institute Dinner, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., February 10, 2004.  
2 Pam Woodall, “The New Titans,” The Economist, September 14th, 2006, 
http://www.economist.com/node/7877959. 
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defined by American hegemony.  
One of the major rising countries of the developing world is China. Before the 21st 
century, onlookers in the field of international relations were unsure of how much China would 
matter in the future given the emphasis on American unipolarity. This is no longer the case. 
China’s rise as a great power within the international system began with various economic 
reforms aimed at modernizing the country starting in 1978. Adopting a strategy of rapid 
economic modernization called for China to integrate itself in the framework of the international 
economic system created by the United States. By adapting to the prevailing norm of Western-
capitalist principles of exchange and joining core institutions of the global economic order like 
the World Trade Organization, China’s strategy over the past four decades has greatly enhanced 
its position in the international political system through its acquired economic power. Nowadays, 
universal recognition of the familiar slogan, “Made in China”, by virtually all consumers speaks 
to China’s growing presence in the world. 
China’s ascent as a great power within the international system has garnered the most 
attention out of all the major headlines of the millennium.3 Given the prominence of the topic 
among scholars, pundits, analysts and policy makers in the West, the rise of China as a major 
player in global politics has become seemingly conventional wisdom.4 Now, the debate revolves 
around how China’s newfound capabilities and national power will affect the international 
political system. While China’s growth is a direct result of its integration into the U.S-led 
economic order, there is no consensus among IR scholars as to what this will mean for the future 
of Sino-American relations and the structure of the global liberal order.  
                                                        
3 Michael Beckley, “Chinas Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security, 36, 3 (2012): 41 
4 Xiaoming Zhang, “China in the Conception of International Society: the English School’s engagements with 
China,” Review of International Studies, 37 (2011): 777 
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A country’s economic strength underlies its political and military influence in 
international relations. In The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Paul Kennedy argues that the 
ability of modern nations to exercise and sustain global hegemony lies in their productive 
capacity.5 China continues to sustain impressive economic growth and is projected to double the 
size of the American economy by 2025, while the United States and other status quo market 
economies recover from the shock of the Western Financial Crisis of 2008.6 In this environment, 
some authors cite evidence of friction between China and the United States increasing in the 
future. From the perspective of these authors, China is a revisionist power that will dramatically 
alter the dynamic of global affairs as its economic development increases its power to a 
hegemonic level. On this side of the debate, authors’ concerns vary from generic assumptions 
based on China’s communist leadership to more serious fears of great power conflict that stem 
from the Chinese behavior in the aftermath of the Western Financial Crisis.  On the other side of 
the debate, authors counter the conclusions of the “China threat theory” by offering historical 
and/or strategic analysis of China’s relationship with the international system. For a variety a 
reasons, these authors believe China favors the economic benefits of status quo stability and is a 
power that will support the foundations of the global order constructed by the United States.  
My thesis on the rise of China and the future of the global liberal order is organized into 
four chapters. The first chapter is a review of the literature. The review presents three potential 
scenarios on China’s future role in international politics. Taken together, the arguments of each 
scenario provide a foundation for interpreting the evidence that is presented in the next chapters. 
                                                        
5 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 
(London, Fontana Press, 1988): 472-480 
6 Dominic Wilson and Anna Stupnytska, “The N-11: More than An Acronym,” Goldman Sachs Global Economic 
Papers, 153 (2007): 8-9 
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The second chapter is a case study on China’s relationship with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The World Trade Organization deals with the global rules of trade between 
nations and is a core institution of the global liberal order. This chapter looks at alternative 
interpretations of China’s membership in the WTO. The evidence presented by each school of 
thought identifies developments for assessing China’s future impact on the international 
economic system. 
The third chapter is a case study on China’s behavior in the South China Sea (SCS). The 
South China Sea is a smaller body of water within the Pacific Ocean, where territorial disputes 
between China and several other nations have the potential to disrupt peace and stability within 
the region. The case study in Chapter Three follows the same methodological approach of the 
second chapter by utilizing alternative interpretations on China’s activity in the South China Sea. 
The evidence presented by the two schools of thought provides a framework for assessing 
China’s future impact on status quo peace and stability of the international political system. 
The first three chapters lay out the crucial arguments for thinking about the future 
trajectory of Chinese foreign policy. The fourth chapter draws conclusions on the research 
presented in the prior chapters. In this chapter, I offer an overall analysis of the evidence 
presented in the second and third chapters. In closing, I present my own conclusion on the rise of 




 Farrell 5 
Chapter 1: Review of the Literature 
This chapter outlines the architecture of the international political system and introduces 
the debate on the rise of China. There is no consensus in the literature over how China’s rise as a 
great power will affect the status quo of the global liberal order, the international political system 
created by the United States. Disagreement over the nature of China’s behavior contributes to 
why authors foresee China’s rise manifesting itself in different ways. The review of the literature 
in this chapter offers a brief summary of the global liberal order and the two dominant schools of 
thought on China’s behavior in the post-2008 era before outlining three scenarios related to 
China’s future impact on global politics (China as a spoiler, supporter, or shirker).  
There are two dominant schools of thought on China’s behavior in the post-2008 era. The 
first school of thought believes China favors a strategy of noncompliance in regards to 
established international norms. The second school of thought believes China still favors an 
approach of working within the multilateral structure of the international political system. The 
two dominant schools of thought offer evidence for evaluating three future scenarios concerning 
China’s behavior. 
Next, the chapter describes the spoiler, supporter, and shirker scenarios. These scenarios 
illustrate possible future roles for China in the international political system. After outlining the 
relevant literature, the thesis conducts a case study of China’s behavior in the World Trade 
Organization in Chapter 2, and a second case study of its actions in the South China Sea in 
Chapter 3. Framing each case study through alternative interpretations of China’s actions 
highlights the important points for considering scenarios of China’s future impact on the 
international political system.  
 Farrell 6 
The Two Schools of Thought on China’s Behavior in the Global Liberal Order 
The global liberal order is characterized by American global hegemony and an emphasis 
on Western rules, norms, and institutions. After the conclusion of World War II, using its 
“newfound power and authority” the United States built a range of regional and global 
institutions as a way of shaping the international system to its preferences. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 enhanced the United States’ pre-eminent position in the world, as the main 
challenger to U.S. dominance was defeated and the legitimacy of American-constructed 
institutions solidified.7 As the world’s largest economy and strongest military power, the United 
States used its global power to shape the international political system to American values and 
interests.8 As a result, the international political system reflects a Western oriented global order. 
Its rules and institutions are rooted in the concepts of democracy and capitalism. When 
evaluating the character of the global liberal order, John Ikenberry, an influential scholar within 
the debate, concludes that the system is integrative and expansive, and provides a strategic 
framework for state security and cooperation under the umbrella of American political, 
economic, and military influence.9 While the United States has faced a significant amount of 
challenges in the 21st century, from a massive budget deficit and the impact of the Western 
Financial Crisis in 2008-2009 to the economic costs of sustaining wars in the Middle East, it 
remains the world’s most preponderant power and the model for global governance it 
constructed is uncontested. The question is how China will affect the global system created and 
led by the United States. 
                                                        
7 Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order 
(New York: Penguin, 2009), 1. 
8 Ibid., 498-99. 
9 G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China: Power, Institutions, and the Western Order,” From Ross, Robert S. and 
Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2008):114. 
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The two dominant schools of thought on China’s strategy in the post-2008 era are 
important to forming conclusions on its future behavior in the global liberal order. The two 
dominant schools of thought within the scholarly literature are informed by core assumptions 
about China’s strategy in the post-2008 era. On the one hand, author Michael Yahuda and many 
writers for Western media sources perceive a new assertiveness in China’s foreign policy that 
signals a departure from abiding by the status quo and norms championed by the U.S order.10 On 
the other hand, Ning Liao claims “today’s China is not only a participant but also a proactive 
actor shaping the regional security multilateralism”.11 The evidence that can be cited in favor of 
these assertions provides a framework for anticipating China’s role in the future. The first school 
of thought believes that China has adopted a more “aggressive” policy, citing China’s actions in 
the post-2008 period that suggest the Chinese government has abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s 
longtime axiom not to treat the United States as an adversary and to shelve sovereignty disputes 
in favor of joint development. This view promotes the belief that China is seeking to challenge 
the U.S. and the global liberal order. The second school of thought believes China has not 
dramatically changed or abandoned Deng’s strategic approach. China still follows a strategy of 
peaceful development, working within the framework of multilateralism to avoid disrupting 
peace and stability in the international political system. 12  
The perspective of the author influences how they look at the evidence and the theories 
they offer on China’s behavior. Michael Swaine notes that commentators interpret the relative 
assertiveness of China’s activism in different ways. When taken together, characterizations of 
                                                        
10 Michael Yahuda, “China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, No. 
81 (2013): 446. 
11 Ning Liao, “China’s Regional Diplomacy toward Southeast Asia: Calculations and Constraints of Beijing’s 
Engagment in Security Multilateralism,” American Journal of Chinese Studies 19, no. 101 (2012):105. 
12 Sarah Raine, “Beijing’s South China Sea Debate,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53, no.5 (2011), 77; 
Yahuda, 446. 
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China’s foreign policy approach appear “somewhat vague and ambiguous, potentially 
encompassing everything from attempts to play a more active role in a wide variety of 
international regimes, to deliberate efforts to alter basic international norms and challenge the 
fundamental national interests or policies of the United States”.13 The debate over what strategy 
informs China’s policy influences the formation of divergent scenarios concerning the country’s 
future intentions.  
China’s Future Role as a Spoiler, Supporter, or Shirker 
Both Western and Chinese scholars have made a wide variety of assertions on how the 
rise of China will manifest itself in the post-Cold War system. The debate circulates around 
whether China will conform to the order created by the United States or if it will use its 
increasing power capabilities to shape international order much like the United States did at the 
end of World War II.14  In their article, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International 
Order in an Era of U.S. Decline”, Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu identify three dominant 
scenarios on how the rise of China may take shape. In its future relationship with the 
international political system and American hegemony, China will choose to act as a spoiler, a 
supporter, or a shirker in relation to the global liberal order.15 In reviewing the literature relevant 
to the discussion, this chapter outlines the three dominant scenarios on China’s future role in the 
international political system. The first scenario foresees China behaving as a “spoiler”, 
challenging or disrupting international norms upheld by the status quo actors in the global liberal 
order. The second scenario sees China as a “supporter” of the global liberal order. This scenario 
                                                        
13 Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part One: On Core Interests”. China Leadership Monitor, no. 
34 (2010):1-2 
14 Ikenberry, 90. 
15 Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. 
Decline,” International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 42. 
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understands China as a responsible stakeholder in the international community and foresees 
continuity in China’s strategy of integrating within established standards and practices of the 
global liberal order. The third scenario predicts China will behave as a “shirker”. The shirker 
scenario predicts China’s foreign policy is inward looking. In this scenario, China will not 
disrupt status quo stability, but it will refuse to accept obligations of the global liberal order, 
instead focusing on challenges the Chinese government faces in the domestic realm. These three 
scenarios are informed by different assumptions and provide a theoretical framework for 
thinking about what the evidence in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 indicate about China’s future role 
in the world.  
The Spoiler Scenario 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has led China to assume the role of the United States’ 
default adversary.16 China is a primary strategic consideration to the United States and the great 
power by which the United States measures itself militarily. Before September 11, 2001 the Bush 
Administration labeled China as a strategic competitor and America’s prime threat.17 While 
China was seen as a strategic partner to America in the war on terror, the Obama Administration 
announced a “national security pivot to Asia” in 2012, revealing an enduring American concern 
for China’s rise and its future intentions.18 The pivot is in response to growing concern over the 
willingness of the Chinese government to act as a responsible stakeholder in the post-2008 era 
and American suspicion over China’s intentions in the South China Sea. 
Political differences in the relationship between China and the United States contribute to 
                                                        
16 James Dobbins, “War with China,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 54, no. 4 (2012): 7. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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a gap in political trust between the two countries. China is not a democracy, has no active civil 
society, and has not yet fully liberalized its economy. China “has fiercely contested the 
normative changes in post-Cold War international society that have seen human rights and 
democratisation become part of the daily round of political practice”.19 China’s continued 
growth within the global system without conforming to Western values such as democracy, 
capitalism, and human rights championed by American hegemony has led commentators in the 
West to speculate on the possibility of the Sino-U.S. rivalry intensifying. Aaron Friedberg 
contemplates that if China “grows richer and stronger without also becoming a liberal 
democracy, the present muted rivalry with the United States is likely to blossom into something 
more open and dangerous”.20 If the two countries cannot manage their differences, economic or 
military conflict may erupt and disturb the status quo of the global liberal order. Political and 
economic differences aside, as an authoritarian regime, the Chinese government lacks the 
transparency to assure other states in the international community of the nature, scope, and 
intended goals of its military buildup. The double digit spending increases in the Chinese defense 
budget since the 1990’s to fuel its military modernization exacerbate fears that China will seek to 
challenge the United States and establish its own hegemony in East Asia as its power capabilities 
continue to expand.21 With its defense spending and military capabilities growing, China has 
also shown an interest in shaping emerging regional political-institutional contours in East Asia 
that seek to exclude the United States.22 
The spoiler scenario has also gained credibility due to various interpretations of Chinese 
                                                        
19 Xiaoming Zhang, “A Rising China and Normative Changes in International Society,” East Asia 28, (2011): 242. 
20 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2011), 2. 
21 Robert Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security 34, 
no. 2 (2009): 45. 
22 Ikenberry, 89. 
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actions in the South China Sea and World Trade Organization. Is China’s policy aggressive, 
assertive, or simply more active?  Each term implies different qualities and emphasizes how an 
author views China’s behavior. Authors from both the scholarly literature and Western media 
sources typically describe China as being more assertive or aggressive. These terms typically 
contribute to the spoiler scenario. Aggressive has a confrontational connotation while 
assertiveness implies confidence. Activeness indicates a higher frequency of participation in the 
international sphere and has a more neutral or positive meaning. 
The debate over the character of China’s diplomacy in the international realm emphasizes 
the divide in the discussion over China’s future intentions. In recent years, Alastair Johnston has 
noted a trend in Western literature and media to cite evidence of a “newly assertive China”, 
ranging from 
China’s allegedly more assertive diplomacy at the Copenhagen conference on climate 
change in December 2009; to its angry reaction to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in January 
2010 and to the Dalai Lama’s visit in February 2010; to its apparently more expansive 
claims over the South China Sea in March 2010; to its diplomatic defense of violent 
actions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in March and November 
2010; and to its tough response to the Japanese arrest of a Chinese ashing captain in 
September 2010.23 
These instances provide grounds for observers to establish theories of competition between the 
United States and China in the global system that could “spoil” the norms of American 
hegemony. James Dobbins declares that a climate of mutual distrust and suspicion clouds the 
US–China relationship. This produces a potent security dilemma in the international political 
system.24 Amitai Etzioni similarly perceives that increasing tensions between the United States 
and China have the potential to lead to a collision between the two powers, citing studies of “a 
                                                        
23 Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’ International Security 37, no. 4 
(2013): 9. 
24 Dobbins, 22. 
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cycle of distrust” with “deep roots in Sino-American history” that has been intensifying since 
2008.25 Could increasing friction in Sino-American foreign policy and strategic suspicion of the 
other’s intention bring an end to the stability of the current global system? 
China as a spoiler is a “vision and strategy consistent with the traditional realist story of 
power transitions”.26 In the spoiler scenario, China will pose a challenge to the existing order 
characterized by global American hegemony: economic and military capabilities will lead China 
to circumvent the liberal order and establish a parallel system much like the Soviet Union did in 
the years following World War II.  Several observers have commented on the fact that while 
China sustains impressive economic growth, the economic preponderance of the United States 
wavers.27 These dichotomous trends – the rise of China and decline of the United States – have 
led a number of scholars to theorize on the possibility of a power transition.  
Aggressive behavior contributes to a theory of power transition consistent with the 
spoiler scenario. Power transition theory posits shifting relations between countries as a formula 
for system change and war.28 The theoretical assumptions of power transition create a foundation 
for the spoiler scenario to present China as a challenger to global order. This scenario draws on 
past instances of hegemonic war to establish an argument for future conflict between the United 
States and China. Historically speaking, power transitions typically are accompanied by conflict, 
instability, and war.29 For China, the risk of conflict with the United States will grow in 
consequence and in probability as Chinese strength increases.30 The World Trade Organization 
                                                        
25 Amitai Etzioni, “Accommodating China,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55, no. 2 (2012): 47. 
26 Schweller and Pu, 59. 
27 Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security 36, No. 3 (2012): 
41; Johnston, 7; Jacques, 499. 
28 Schweller and Pu, 65. 
29 Ikenberry, 90. 
30 Dobbins, 8. 
 Farrell 13 
and South China Sea are important focal points for identifying economic and military conflict 
between the United States and China. 
Castel-Fodor notes that an increasing frequency in the disputes brought to the World 
Trade Organization has led many observers and media sources that fall under the spoiler scenario 
to cite evidence of a trade war materializing between China and the United States in the WTO.31 
An increase in litigation signals that China’s governance structure is incompatible with 
international norms of the global liberal economic order, and could lead to a deterioration of 
relations between China and its trading partners. These concerns are one way of understanding 
how China’s rise could “spoil” the international economic system upheld by the architecture of 
the global liberal order. 
Changes in the status of North Korea and Taiwan, Sino-American confrontation in 
cyberspace, and disputes arising from China’s uneasy relationships with Japan and India create 
tension over China’s rise. A number of flashpoints in China’s relationship with the international 
community increase alarm about future conflict, such as in the South China Sea. China has 
apparently been more aggressive in the South China Sea to demonstrate its jurisdiction over the 
area. This activity appears to be occurring in the whole area within the nine-dotted line, a map 
that illustrates China’s sovereignty claim in the South China Sea. China’s actions in the South 
China Sea appear to be at odds with the interests of the international community. In reference to 
the nine-dotted line, Denny Roy argues that China’s claims in the South China Sea have no 
foundation in modern international law.32 Dobbins notes that the South China Sea has the 
potential to become a serious flashpoint in recent years as a result of China’s assertion of its 
                                                        
31 Kennan J. Castel-Fodor, “Providing a Release Valve: The U.S.-China Experience with the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 64, no. 1 (2013): 237. 
32 Denny Roy, Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security (New York: Cornell, 2013): Ch. 4.  
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sovereignty over the region and its military modernization. 33 Whereas friction in the WTO is 
occurring in the economic realm, competing security objectives between China, its neighbors, 
and the United States in the South China Sea have considerable potential to erupt into military 
conflict. 
Offensive realist John Mearsheimer believes that China and the United States are 
destined to be adversaries. According to Mearsheimer, the “mightiest states attempt to establish 
hegemony in their region of the world while making sure that no rival great power dominates 
another region”.34 As Mearsheimer sees it, “no amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense 
security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia”.35 Chinese 
insecurities will increase as it continues its rise into a system dominated by US hegemony. If one 
is to evaluate Beijing’s regional environment from a realist perspective, the United States’ 
strategy in East Asia demonstrates “the key features of a cold-war strategy: a military posture 
stressing overwhelming superiority and effective deterrence, an ideological position that seeks to 
delegitimise China; and a plan of building or reviving a regional diplomatic bloc or bilateral 
military alliances in China’s neighbourhood”.36 For China, displacing US hegemonic power can 
only satisfy these insecurities, as being the only regional hegemon in the world is the “ideal 
situation”.37  
Scholars who interpret China’s rise through a lens of offensive realism find evidence for 
the spoiler scenario by asserting that the increasing aggression in Chinese foreign policy in the 
years following 2008’s financial crisis is a conscious decision by the Chinese government to 
                                                        
33 Dobbins, 7-12. 
34 John J. Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," Current History 105, no. 690 (2006): 160. 
35 Ibid., 162. 
36 Lanxin Xiang, “China and the ‘Pivot’,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 54, no. 5 (2012): 117. 
37 Mearsheimer, 161. 
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challenge American interests in East Asia.38 Traditional realist perspectives of power transition 
that are consistent with the spoiler scenario assume that the international system is based in 
anarchy, that great power military capabilities breed further insecurity, and that no actors can be 
completely sure of other’s intentions. This causes states to fear each other, as there is no 
omnipresent police force to ensure peaceful resolution of conflict. For China to protect its 
national interests, it must continue militarization to back a more assertive policy stance towards 
the United States.39  
Mearsheimer understands international relations through a lens that “war perpetuates 
international order”. That is, in its bid for regional hegemony, China will have no other way to 
secure its national interests unless it displaces US global leadership, and the United States will 
have no other choice but to confront China if it wants to sustain its hegemony. In this scenario, 
power projection and a robust military to back assertions are the keys to states’ security 
objectives. As China’s power capabilities increase, it will have the resources to further resist 
Western norms and defend Chinese interests in the world. By acknowledging the logic of an 
offensive realist like John Mearsheimer, one may take into account how security issues in the 
Sino-American relationship may escalate and take a turn for the worst, leading to a manifestation 
of the spoiler scenario.  
The Supporter Scenario 
 Authors that fall under the supporter scenario emphasize trends of conflict management 
and cooperation in both the World Trade Organization and South China Sea that mitigate the 
                                                        
38 Johnston, 7. 
39 Mearsheimer, 160. 
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chances of a trade war or military conflict.40 In the second scenario, China will become a 
supporter of the existing status quo, working within the existing rules of the game and 
contributing its fair share to global governance while assuring other participants of its 
commitment to Western norms.41 Amitai Etzioni notes Chinese congruence with the 
international community in his article, “Accommodating China”. As he writes, “China signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, joined the UN Security Council in unanimously 
condemning North Korea’s 2012 ballistic- missile test and January 2013 nuclear test, and 
conducted its first bilateral anti-piracy operation with the US Navy in the Horn of Africa at the 
end of last year”.42 These trends stand at odds with the spoiler scenario. 
In “The Rise of China: Power, Institutions, and the Western Order”, John Ikenberry 
similarly notes Chinese integration within the current global system by citing various 
developments in the 21st century. He writes that “China is at the center of proliferating regional 
and bilateral trade agreements and the rapid rise of intra-Asian trade. Its capital reserves are a 
major source of American borrowing – indirectly financing Washington’s tax cuts and the Iraq 
War. China has a leading role in the Six Party nuclear talks on North Korea”.  He also writes, 
“China’s commercial and energy ties are expanding around the world”. This point highlights that 
in order to sustain its modernization, China will have to rely on the global liberal economy for 
trade to secure the resources vital to domestic growth.43   
The supporter scenario challenges the theory of the rise and fall of great powers by 
informing its argument through historical developments in the international political system. Not 
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all power transitions generate war or overturn the international order, such as when British 
hegemony was ceded to the United States peacefully after World War II.44 China will continue to 
accommodate to the status quo of the order to maintain the benefits of trade and investment 
offered by the global capitalist system.45 When state actors see an incentive to participate in 
global order, there is less of a chance for friction between the rising power and the hegemon and 
more of a chance the rising power will adopt the practices of international society to become a 
“normal” actor in the system.  
China, for the most part, largely works within the economic constraints of the 
international system created by the United States and has utilized the framework of the 
international economic system to sustain overwhelming growth for over 30 years. In addition, 
China has joined the international community in a number of institutions, which seems to 
suggest that the rising power can be socialized into the “status quo”. The theory of socialization 
asserts that “by involving new powers in the current structures and making them responsible 
stakeholders, the US can bind those new powers into the current architecture, thus securing its 
own influence”.46 
The socialization hypothesis resonates heavily with the supporter scenario, asserting that 
the foundation of the American constructed liberal order satisfies the security interests of rising 
powers to guarantee the durability of the status quo. As international actors rise, the incentives 
gained from participation are attractive enough to ensure responsible behavior and a stake in 
                                                        
44 G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?,” Foreign 
Affairs, January 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63042/g-john-ikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-the-
future-of-the-west. 
45 Ikenberry, 107. 
46 Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou, “U.S. and rising powers in a post-hegemonic global order,” International Affairs 
89, no. 3 (2013): 635. 
 Farrell 18 
upholding the current system. The supporter scenario relies on the theory of a fundamental shift 
in the principles of the international system following the establishment of the liberal order. 
Power politics and the utility of war have been replaced by economic thinking, and globalization 
has led actors to become increasingly dependent on each other. While changing attitudes towards 
war have downplayed the importance of power policy, its increasing irrelevance as a tool for 
countries’ to utilize largely stems from the success of the United States in creating a global 
economy that has since become institutionalized in the international system. The incentives 
offered by the global economy have enhanced cooperation between state actors through the 
opening of domestic markets and have delegitimized protectionist policies like those that brought 
about the Great Depression in the U.S. and the collapsing market in Germany.  In the global 
liberal order, there is a stress on economic thinking. Liberalized trade and avoiding armed 
conflict – in contrast to pouring money into military expenses and retaining closed markets – acts 
as the crux of international stability. If China is indeed a supporter, this rationale influenced 
Deng Xiaoping to adopt the economic reforms, which has increased Chinese dependence on the 
global system since 1978 and will bind China’s rise to the structure of the international political 
system. 
Understanding the functions of the liberal order may lead one to believe that China will 
continue its integration into the established international system. John Ikenberry argues that 
China will accommodate itself to the global system, becoming a supporter of the order 
established by the United States. First, he claims that “the more institutionalized and 
encompassing the existing order is, the more difficult it is for a newly rising state to overturn 
it”.47  Bearing this in mind, the US emerged from World War II understanding the importance of 
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restricting war to allow economic productivity as the key to securing its own interests while 
meeting the needs of everyone else. The United States gave guarantees to participants in the 
system through the formation of a variety of multilateral institutions that encompassed political, 
economic, and military issues. Providing concrete incentives to allies offered an alternative 
means of security by investing in a globalized order where actors have common interests as 
opposed to their own national interests. As economic rationale developed, liberalized trade acted 
as the staple of global security. Commenting on the structure of the global liberal order, 
Ikenberry writes that the array of multilateral institutions and security pacts in the global liberal 
order are elements of a political architecture that allows for states within the hegemonic order to 
do business with each other, reducing surprises while allowing states to build long-term, 
mutually beneficial relations.48 Chinese foreign policy seems to suggest that it has been working 
within this framework. Since 1978, China has become a member of various regional and 
multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organization and the Association of South East 
Nations Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea). China has also signed legally binding 
agreements that come with WTO membership, and agreed to the 2002 China-ASEAN 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. Furthermore, China has shown a pattern of participating 
in constructive diplomatic dialogues with trading partners to manage relations over economic 
and security matters. All of these efforts suggest continuity in China’s integrationist strategy. 
As Ikenberry sees it, the institutional depth and scope of the Western order will force 
China to accommodate the system, regardless of any grievances it may have, even current U.S. 
dominance. This is because China will not just be facing the hegemon if it tries to overturn the 
system, but also the numerous “allies” the US has who benefit from the liberal characteristics of 
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the order. In contrast to realist views, Ikenberry states, “this larger complex of democracies is not 
simply an aggregation of GNP and defense spending, but more or less an institutionalized 
political order”.49 The supporter scenario offers an evaluation of China’s ascent to power by 
considering the nature of the international system, a key element that frames how great powers 
rise in the present day. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the international system has become characterized by 
democratic principles that act as a check on hegemony. Ikenberry argues that the global liberal 
“is led by the United States in important respects but in a more profound sense it is an order that 
has its own features and laws of motion”.50 He describes this relationship as the system’s 
“democratic complex”, which is an alliance of democracies that operate in a way that makes it 
hard for the lead state, the United States, to pursue a hardline policy against other great powers 
like China.51 While the United States is the current hegemon, it is still a democracy that is 
institutionally bound to other great powers and must restrain itself from asserting its hegemony 
in ways that contradict democratic principles. Even though the most powerful actors define the 
rules of international relations, the institutionalization of the liberal system has created 
boundaries in relation to what the international community deems acceptable behavior.  China is 
not a democracy, but it has accepted Western capitalist principles of exchange, and as a result 
has institutional ties to both the United States and other democracies that it does business with. 
The process of Chinese integration is reflected in the two-way economic relationship fostered 
between the state and international community since becoming a part of the global economy. As 
a member of the global liberal order, China will be inclined to further bind itself to the status quo 
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in order to sustain its benefits. 
The supporter scenario notes that “the more institutionalized and encompassing the 
existing order is, the more difficult it is for a newly rising state to overturn it”.52 Given the 
increasingly intertwined bond between China and international society, the supporter scenario 
believes that China would be hard-pressed to establish an alternative order or resist conforming 
to the global liberal order under the United States. A world characterized by the supporter vision 
accepts the legitimacy of American ideological staples, such as democracy, human rights, and 
capitalism in international society. The mainstream, Western attitude maintained by the 
supporter scenario is that China will inevitably become a Western-style country.  When it comes 
to the prospect of democratization during China’s rise in the supporter vision, it is important to 
consider the democratic complex of the system outlined by Ikenberry. The continuation of the 
American global liberal order accepts “the notion that democracy is not only a universally valid 
norm but also one that could be helpful in overcoming many political problems”.53 The 
plausibility of the supporter scenario manifesting itself is suggested by Chinese scholar 
Xiaoming Zhang, who concludes that “China has to continue to change itself in order to 
influence the world in its own way” and “it is not wise for China to challenge those values, such 
as democracy and human rights, otherwise China is sure to be isolated in the Western dominated 
international society”.54   
Evidence that Western values have percolated into Chinese society and will influence the 
future transformation of the country can be found in Chinese scholarship. Scholars Yu Keping 
and Yan Jian argue that “democracy is a good thing”, and Yu Xintian asserts her belief that 
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human rights is a “universal value”.55 For the more Western liberal-minded defenders of the 
supporter scenario, the question is not whether China will become a democracy, but rather how 
that transition will happen.56 China may challenge the United States’ hegemony, but this will be 
a peaceful and diplomatic process that engages the “democratic complex of the system” where 
China has already accepted globalized Western norms of democracy and economic liberalization.  
The Shirker Scenario  
The third scenario can be labeled the shirker scenario and identifies how China is 
unwilling to participate in all aspects of the global liberal order. As the supporter scenario 
suggests, the rise of China has led to the expectation that the Chinese will take on a more 
proactive role in the world.57 However, a substantial amount of analytical literature on China’s 
approach to global governance cites a strong disposition towards the principles of 
noninterference and self-governance.58 Fundamental political and cultural divisions between 
China and the international community cause the country to resist all out acceptance of 
dominant, Western oriented international norms. Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko point 
out that “Beijing adheres to traditional norms of sovereignty and nonintervention in other states’ 
internal affairs”.59 Following the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, Xiaoming Zhang notes that 
governments and civil societies in the West have been pressuring China to liberalize its domestic 
system in relation to the Western criteria, calling China’s sovereignty into question.60 Despite 
facing greater external pressures, China shows a reluctance to act as a “responsible stakeholder” 
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in the global liberal order by resisting prevailing Western norms. The Chinese government “does 
not subscribe to the prevailing Western norms of individualism, human rights, transparency, 
democracy promotion, or humanitarian intervention”.61 In addition, policymakers in China 
continuously reiterate that foreign policy serves domestic goals of reform and development.62 
These overlapping observations about China’s strategic approach to the global system create a 
persuasive platform for the scenario that sees China resisting proclaimed international norms in 
the Western-centric global order.  
China’s priority for domestic concerns allows for some interesting parallels to be drawn 
on the consistency of Chinese shirking behavior and its foreign policy. There are several 
citations within the literature that highlight China’s unwillingness to cooperate as a responsible 
stakeholder. For example, Foot and Walker observe that China has adopted a minimalist 
approach to climate protection, highlighted by the defensive response of the Chinese to emission 
restrictions at the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009.63 China articulated its stance as a 
developing country, which prioritizes rapid economic growth over binding international 
agreements that it sees as an encroachment upon state sovereignty.64  Adopting a similar policy 
approach to its stance on arms control negotiations, China stated it would participate in the fight 
against international climate change “only after the major powers responsible for originally 
creating these problems have made binding and costly commitments”.65 The Chinese approach 
to issues of international concern acts as evidence that suggests China’s preoccupation with 
problems within its region and borders will cause it to neglect participating in solving challenges 
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with global dimensions. Maintaining stability and legitimacy in the domestic realm are crucial 
concerns of the Chinese government, and addressing security challenges related to these matter 
will always be prioritized over accepting international standards that China does not see as 
critical to its national interest. Freeriding on the progress of the global liberal order without 
making the seemingly necessary contributions to maintain its survival will heavily impact the 
orientation of the global system. 
Rising powers are not eager to assume the responsibilities of managing the global 
system.66 By depicting China as a self-concerned actor preoccupied with modernization and 
domestic issues that will see its interests best met by resisting the burdens of leadership while 
continuing its participation in the global system, the shirker scenario refutes the logic of power 
transition theory, which predicts that China will be a spoiler to the current foundation for order. 
At the same time, the vision of an order presents a second path to China’s peaceful rise, different 
from the rationale that underpins the socialization hypothesis of the supporter scenario, which 
sees China adopting Westerns norms and becoming a responsible stakeholder. The shirker 
scenario sees China as an inward looking state that prioritizes the mounting domestic challenges 
it will face in the future, unconcerned with the maintenance of the global commons as according 
to the American criterion. The shirker scenario raises the importance of Chinese sovereignty and 
the question of how the country applies the principle of noninterference to global order.  
The spoiler and supporter scenarios cite important findings that shape the contours of the 
China debate, but are “half blind in ignoring the contingent nature of China’s future 
intentions”.67  The global system brought about by the shirker scenario is legitimized by a theory 
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that counters core assumptions of the spoiler and supporter scenarios. It “is one more consistent 
with a power diffusion process of system change than with one based on the transition of 
power”.68 Whereas the challenger scenario interprets coming poles in power capabilities between 
China and the United States as recipes for war and system reconfiguration, the third scenario 
where China acts as a shirker acknowledges that the core characteristics of global liberal order 
can endure without retaining an emphasis on upholding international norms associated with 
American hegemony. A diffusion of power that results in a transformation of the Western 
oriented international political system to a negotiated liberal order is likely in a world of rising 
non-Western actors and changing power relations. This vision challenges both realist 
fascinations with tales of power transition emphasized by the spoiler scenario as well as the 
overly optimistic predictions of China as a “gung-ho” promoter of American order based on the 
supremacy of Western values and Chinese indebtedness to the economic structure of the global 
liberal order seen in the supporter scenario. The shirker scenario argues that a rising great power 
like China will act rationally rather than trying to overturn the structure or accept too many 
obligations under the American model that could divert attention from domestic interests or drain 
China’s crucial national resources.69 China will seek to maximize its gains in the system that its 
rise is embedded in, where, as Scheweller writes, “security is plentiful, territory is devalued, and 
a robust liberal consensus exists”.70  
As Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou suggests, rising powers are different from typical 
stakeholders in the American-led order. She writes, “they do not share Western values as 
traditional US allies have done” and “their political and economic systems are not similar to that 
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of the US”.71 China has maintained a successful path to development without fully subscribing to 
the promulgated principles of the Washington Consensus. China sees “virtue in a strong state, a 
disciplined society, stable economic growth, and national security over ‘imported’ notions of 
human rights, democracy, and unregulated markets”.72 The third scenario questions the 
legitimacy of the socialization hypothesis by acknowledging the divergent interests of great 
powers like China that are less concerned with supporting a system built around American 
standards. While the supporter scenario predicts that China will adopt proper Western economic 
liberalization and democratic governance along with allocating its resources towards the well 
being of the ‘global commons’, the vision of a negotiated order argues that China can maintain 
its integration into the global liberal order without complying with Western demands.  
China will exhibit freeriding behavior, reaping the benefits of the global economy while 
resisting conforming to international standards enunciated by organizations like the WTO that 
China see as less crucial than its domestic interests.73 The coming of what Schweller and Pu coin 
as “nonpolarity” will be influenced by the United States’ reaction to this trend. Frustrated over 
the costs of sustaining order without the support of rising powers like China, the United States 
will withdraw from obligations to manage security in the global liberal order that it does not see 
as crucial to its national interest. Without hegemonic enforcement, global order as constituted by 
the United States will come to an end, leading to a de-emphasis on cooperation between states to 
uphold international norms, specifically Western liberal norms that have become the rule of 
thumb in global society. If order does persist, it will be without a primary organizer.74 With this 
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in mind, Chinese refusal of the United States’ call for a “G-2” alliance – where China acts as a 
“co-managing partner on issues such as trade and currency reform, climate change, food safety, 
peace and stability in East Asia, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and perhaps 
even the Israeli- Palestinian conflict”75 – is a crucial indicator of how China’s approach 
according to the shirker scenario will lead to the deterioration of American world order and the 
birth of an international political environment characterized by attitudes of laissez faire and 
international strategies being coordinated at the national level. 
When looking at arguments within the spoiler and supporter scenarios on their own, each 
scenario offers significant evidence to justify their theoretical foundations of power transition or 
socialization, two radically different conclusions. These two scenarios are largely formed by the 
aggressive and integrative schools of thought that have emerged in the post-2008 era as a 
response to Chinese policies. As the shirker scenario seems to suggest, the stark dichotomy 
posited by the spoiler scenario and supporter scenario on China’s future role in the world 
simplifies a complex reality. However, while the shirker scenario identifies how the sacrosanct 
issue of sovereignty influences China’s integration into the global liberal order, its conclusions 
on nonpolarity are challenged by the evidence of China moving away from principles of 
noninterference in certain aspects of its policy and cooperating with the international community. 
China contributes to peacekeeping missions, accept resolutions from the WTO dispute settlement 
body in areas where its policy has not met international standards, and in 2014 signed an 
agreement with the United States on limiting global carbon emissions.76 This suggests that 
China’s prioritization of national interest does not explicitly call for the country to apply 
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principles of noninterference in every case of its relations with the international system. While 
the shirker scenario also identifies key themes for assessing China’s strategy on the global stage 
and how the world may move towards a negotiated liberal order, its argument is countered by 
developments that suggest China’s activity may influence a multipolar order, rather than 
nonpolar order, to develop. 
China’s Activity in the World Trade Organization and South China Sea 
The debate surrounding China’s future foreign policy strategy provides this thesis with a 
foundation for conducting two case studies that focus on China’s behavior in the World Trade 
Organization, Chapter 2, and in the South China Sea, Chapter 3. These two arenas are critical 
focal points when considering the effect that China’s rise will have on global economic and 
security norms. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 utilize alternative interpretations of China’s behavior in 
the WTO and SCS to frame the debate on its overall strategy. While the first school of thought 
emphasizes conflict, the second school of thought emphasizes conflict management. Both 
schools of thought on China’s policy offer relevant evidence for understanding the future 
trajectory of China’s relationship with the international political system, but they need to be 
interpreted collectively. When taken together, the debate on China’s strategy and the role that the 
country will play in the future raises three important questions. First, as it continues to rise, what 
approach will China take in its relationship with the international political system? Second, can 
the challenges to China’s relationship with the United States and the international community be 
resolved to retain status quo stability? Third, if China can accomplish a peaceful rise, will there 
be a reconfiguration of prevalent norms in the global liberal order? While only time will tell how 
China’s rise will actually manifest itself, conducting case studies on the WTO and SCS may help 
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Chapter 2: China and the World Trade Organization 
This chapter is about identifying alternative interpretations of China’s membership in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). There are varying interpretations of China’s membership in 
the WTO that can be sorted into two schools of thought. The goal of this chapter is to analyze 
China’s relationship with the global economic system based on the perspectives of relevant 
authors and the evidence they use to support both sides of this argument. The first school of 
thought identifies China’s membership in the World Trade Organization as a negative 
development that threatens to undermine the global economic system upheld by the WTO. The 
second school of thought addresses the question from a less selective utilization of the evidence 
against China, considering the realities of the international political system to identify the roots 
of conflict and examine how tensions are being managed between China and the international 
community through the WTO. 
 Singling out China, Susan Aaronson claims that the country “could break the WTO 
because it fails to enforce its own laws in a transparent, evenhanded manner and is willing to 
ignore its international commitments to maintain power”.77 Evaluating China’s membership in 
the WTO and the frequency of disputes filed against the country, Aaronson states that Chinese 
integration has been characterized by an inadequacy of governance. In a similar evaluation that 
portrays China’s membership in a negative light, Henry Gao concludes that China has evolved 
from passively accepting WTO rules. An increase in litigation by China in the post-2008 era 
highlights a strategy of “aggressive” legalism that could “shake” the structure of the WTO.78  
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China has filed 11 complaints over the possibility of foreign trade barriers and has been a 
respondent for similar charges in 31 cases. Since China-Intellectual Property Rights in 2007, 
China has acted as a respondent in 24 of the 31 cases filed against it. China has also filed 7 of its 
11 complaints since initiating an anti-dumping investigation into poultry products from the 
United States in 2009.79 It is important to engage why there is an increasing frequency of 
litigation being filed and what this trend means. From the perspective of this school of thought, 
disputes involving China illustrate that the country’s role in the WTO could contribute to the 
deterioration of trading partnerships among member states, undermining the goal of promoting 
open and free trade enunciated by the World Trade Organization. 
On the other side of the debate, authors utilize a different approach than the first school 
of thought to reach conclusions on China’s relationship with the WTO. The second school of 
thought emphasizes the historic context of disputes involving China and the institutional purpose 
of the World Trade Organization. In contrast to the first school of thought, Gerald Chan believes 
that China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization is the most peaceful development of the 
post-Cold War Era.80 China’s membership signifies a rising power seeing its interests being best 
met by integrating into the architecture of the global liberal order. The adaptation of China’s 
overall strategy to achieve its objectives within this context demonstrates that it has an interest in 
maintaining the status quo to continue its economic growth without disrupting the international 
economic system or seriously confronting trading partners like the United States. Building on 
this point, legal scholar Kennan J. Castel Fodor notes that the increasing frequency in disputes 
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being filed to the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB) highlights an effort by China and the 
United States to resolve issues in their bilateral trading relationship. Even though there has been 
an increase in litigation, academic scholars Adriaan Luyten and Sven Van Kerckhoven state that 
there is little evidence to support the claim that China is disturbing how the World Trade 
Organization functions.81 In fact, China’s role in the WTO actually allows the organization to 
serve its intended purpose of managing conflict. In the long term, the utilization of the WTO 
DSB channels members’ divergent interests toward a long-term investment in the international 
economic system.82 From this perspective, historical context is key to explaining the issues 
before jumping to conclusions about the adequacy of Chinese government adversely affecting 
other WTO members and disrupting the global economy.  
In the present day, measures relating to dumping, protectionism and the implementation 
of international norms are the key topics in assessing China’s relationship with the global 
economic system. These issues have historically been at the center of China’s relationship with 
the global economy, and since China’s entrance into the WTO remain the dominant focal points 
for authors offering input on China’s economic strategy. Historical context is key in analyzing 
the issues of dumping, protectionism, and implementation of norms to identify what type of 
behavior China is displaying in its relationship with the WTO. This chapter will introduce the 
first school of thought’s interpretation to identify tensions in China’s relationship with the global 
economic system. Next, the chapter will describe the evolution of China’s relationship with the 
international economic system as a means to conceptualizing the second school of thought. This 
will provide historical perspective for Aaronson’s argument. After doing so, the chapter will 
examine the issues concerning China and the WTO from the perspective of the second school of 
                                                        
81 Van Kerckhoven and Luyten, 207. 
82 Castel-Fodor, 237. 
 Farrell 33 
thought. Conducting an evaluation of the subject matter will bring about a better understanding 
of China’s strategy and help to enable conclusions on the nature of its relationship with the 
WTO. Is China’s membership in the WTO a positive or negative development? 
Complaints Against China in the World Trade Organization 
Ka Zeng notes that trading disputes between China and the international community 
focus on the Chinese government supporting domestic enterprises through tariffs, subsidies, 
grants, refunds, and exemptions from taxes that either provide an unfair advantage to Chinese 
exporters, or restrict foreign market access in China”.83 Disputes concerning China’s measures 
imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties on products from the United States, EU and 
their trade allies have increasingly been brought before the World Trade Organization dispute 
settlement body (WTO DSB) in the post-2008 era. Between 2010 and 2012, the United States 
filed three complaints to the WTO DSB, accusing China of violating anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty (CVDs) clauses in a number of industries. In Dispute 414, electronic steel 
from the U.S., and Dispute 427, chicken broiler products from the U.S., the WTO DSB ruled in 
favor of the United States, finding China to be guilty of imposing import restrictions against U.S. 
steel and chicken broiler products.84 In Dispute 440, involving the same measures in the 
automobile industry, a similar ruling found China to be in violation of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.85 The fact that China was found to be in violation of WTO standards in each case in 
the post-2008 period provides support for Aaronson’s belief that China continues to ignore both 
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international and local laws pertaining to the international trading system and WTO 
obligations.86 
In addition to these three cases, the United States and its allies have also brought two 
cases to the WTO DSB relating to other protectionist policies enacted by the Chinese 
government since the Western Financial Crisis. An essential part of receiving admittance to the 
WTO is negotiating the most favored nation process and removing trade tariffs. Members of the 
WTO dedicate themselves to upholding these economic reforms when signing the General 
Agreement on Tariffs/Trade. The GATT Agreement is a critical WTO agreement that holds 
signatories responsible for enforcing equal and open trade. A critical concern of WTO members 
is receiving market access into the Chinese economy and receiving the same prices as China’s 
domestic industries. As a WTO signatory, China is responsible for extending national treatment 
to foreign industries. Skepticism over China’s industrial policy and the fact that key sectors of 
the Chinese industry receive preferential treatment from the government – even though they are 
competing in a globalized market – has led the United States and its allies to challenge perceived 
protectionist policies in the Chinese economy using the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
In 2009, the United States and several of its allies filed Dispute 394 to the WTO DSB, a 
complaint against China over measures related to the exportation of various raw materials.87 A 
similar case was initiated by the United States, Europe, and Japan in 2012. The second dispute is 
known as Dispute 431, measures related to the Exportation of Rare Earths.88 Raw materials and 
rare earths are resources critical to a variety of countries’ domestic industries. China is the 
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world’s largest supplier of rare earths with a 90% share of global production.89 These resources 
fuel industrialized markets around the world. China can drastically affect the global market by 
restricting the export of these resources. In the disputes, the United States asserted that, without 
proper justification, China put export restraints on raw materials and rare earths key to both its 
own energy needs and a multitude of U.S.-made products like wind turbines. 
In each dispute filed, China was found guilty of the claims made by the United States and 
other WTO members. The WTO DSB ruled that China was guilty of enacting policy 
incompatible with the established legal framework for the international trading system, and 
stated that China lacked an appropriate justification for its export restrictions. The close spacing 
of the disputes supports the argument that China is both unwilling to respect the agreements it 
signed in its Accession Protocol, and favors its own national objectives at the cost of the rest of 
the world. China was found to be in violation of the GATT 1994 and its WTO obligations and 
commitment in regards to its export quotas, export duties, and export licensing. Although China 
cited its conservation policy in imposing the rare earth restrictions, the DSB critiqued China’s 
lack of transparency in not reporting the reasons for, or details of, changes in its export policies. 
The DSB also denied the legitimacy of China’s claim that it was following environmental 
standards by imposing higher rates on foreign industries, but not its own.  
The rare earth dispute was in close proximity to Japan’s purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands in 2012. Ownership of these islands disputed in the East China Sea is a contentious issue 
in Sino-Japanese relations. The purchase of the islands may have prompted China to take its own 
unilateral action against Japan, along with the U.S and EU for supporting Japan’s position. 
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Restricting the import of crucial rare earths to the targeted countries for political reasons 
negatively affects their domestic industries and contradicts WTO policy. Not only do export 
restrictions provide a competitive advantage to Chinese domestic industries by forcing foreign 
industries to buy rare earth at a higher price, but also affect a significant share of trade, 
employment, and production in targeted countries.90 In each case, Chinese policy is indicative of 
behavior that undermines WTO norms. Export restrictions are in clear violation of the GATT 
Agreement WTO members are obligated to uphold. Furthermore, the use of export restrictions 
by the Chinese government is an example of the PRC coupling political issues with economic 
diplomacy to leverage the U.S., EU, and Japan into complying with its demands. Based on the 
obligations of WTO members outlined by the GATT Agreement, China’s behavior in these 
instances violates the terms it accepted when joining the WTO. 
Questioning China’s Domestic Bureaucracy 
In Dispute 427, anti-dumping and countervailing duties concerning chicken broiler 
products, the United States cited evidence of what the first school of thought would call 
“inadequate governance”, targeting the bureaucratic efficiency of the PRC from multiple fronts. 
In the report submitted to the WTO DSB, the United States claimed “improper dumping and 
injury determination, improper reliance on the facts available, failure to provide access to 
relevant information, insufficient explanation of the basis for the determinations, absence of 
proper analysis of the effects of imports under investigation, and absence of objective 
determination of causality” on the part of the Chinese government.91 The United States argued 
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that China had caused harm to its domestic industry through misinformed calculations in 
industrial policy and a lack of bureaucratic aptitude to justify its measures. 
The performance of the Chinese state in regards to meeting international standards in a 
variety of disputes has been interpreted by the first school of thought as a disregard for the rule 
of law that the Chinese agreed to uphold when joining the WTO. As with other disputes filed in 
recent years, issues pertaining to intellectual property rights serve as a platform for an argument 
against the compliance of China’s domestic institutions in meeting WTO obligations. The 
intellectual property issue enforces Susan Aaronson’s point that China has a “culture of 
noncompliance”, where bad actors set the norm, and China’s behavior is inherently contradictory 
to agreements it signed, due to the fact it refuses to build bureaucratic efficacy.92 The first school 
of thought believes the strategy China has taken thus so far in pursuing its national development 
undermines the overall structure of the World Trade Organization. 
The frequency of disputes within the World Trade Organization targeting China for 
dumping and enacting protectionist policies illustrates that members of the international 
community are skeptical of the lengths that China takes to fulfill the obligations of WTO 
membership. George Bush enunciated the Western perspective in 2002 when stating that China 
“has the right and responsibility to fashion and enforce the rules of open trade”.93 Yet, charges 
by the United States and claims made by Aaronson suggest the Chinese government has not 
made an adequate effort to create an effective institutional structure for maintaining the 
commitments of its WTO membership. 
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 In the 2013 USTR report to Congress, intellectual property rights (IPR) was the first 
priority issue cited by the U.S on China’s WTO compliance.94 Given the fact that America is one 
of the most, if not the most, technologically innovative and advanced economies in the world, it 
has a keen interest in protecting the assets of a highly specialized economic sector that sets it 
apart from the rest of the world. Therefore, protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights has evolved into a critical issue in the age of globalization to guard advanced economies 
against the costs of piracy. While the Chinese leadership claims it has made an effort to address 
the protection of IPR, pirating continues to grow. In the 1990’s, the U.S estimated that pirating 
losses in China were around 2 billion dollars a year, and foregone sales from IPR theft is seen by 
the U.S as a critical challenge to the American economy. A study on intellectual property theft in 
in 2009 estimated the United States suffered 48 billion dollars in losses due to IPR infringement 
in China.95 More recent studies have indicated that the US suffers a loss of between 150 billion 
and 240 billion USD annually in China.96 As a result of large-scale intellectual property theft, the 
Chinese government has come under attack for its ability to implement and enforce the critical 
international norm of protecting intellectual property rights. In 2007, the United States filed 
Dispute 362 through the WTO DSB, requesting the WTO begin an investigation into the 
enforcement and protection of intellectual property rights by the Chinese government. Taken 
together with other charges filed by WTO members against China, a negative conclusion in 
Dispute 362 may suggest that China has not made a serious effort to adapt to the standards of the 
World Trade Organization, supporting the claims of the first school of thought. 
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The Historic Context of Disputes 
Understanding why disputes concerning China are a central focus in the World Trade 
Organization requires historical context before coming to a conclusion on China’s relationship 
with the global economic system. China’s evolution into a major economic player in the 
international system resulted from an ongoing process of political and economic reform initiated 
by the Chinese leadership since 1978 to bring the country into accordance with the economic 
norms of the global liberal order. The normalization of relations between China and the United 
States’ as a result of the Nixon-Mao rapprochement in 1972 set the stage for China’s 
reformation.  Prior to rapprochement, the People’s Republic of China was isolated from the 
international community: 1949-1969 in U.S.-China relations is identified as the containment 
period.97  The most crucial aspect of the containment period is the trading embargo the United 
States and its allies imposed upon China.98 The trade embargo barred the Chinese from 
developing trade relationships with the international community like those of its Asian 
neighbors.  As a result of U.S. economic warfare, China was isolated from the liberal trading 
structure developing around the United States during the first half of the Cold War. Whereas 
other Asian countries with Western trading ties began to grow through export-led development, 
China was the one major country with a domestic economy completely isolated from the 
international economic system till reforms began in 1978.99 
Without access to international markets, the Maoist government took an autarkic 
approach to addressing China’s economic problems. The state-planned economic model made 
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initial steps towards industrializing the agrarian based economy, but state orchestrated policies 
like the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution adversely affected both the country’s 
population and economy. The stagnation of the Chinese economy acted as a barrier to securing 
Chinese autonomy: China’s ability to both develop and defend itself in relation to the rest of the 
world dwindled as America and its allies’ relative power and security grew from the economic 
success of globalized markets in the liberal order. 
Rapprochement in the 1970’s extended China an invitation to take a more active role in 
the order taking shape around the United States. By the end of the Maoist Era, the Chinese 
leadership faced political and economic crisis.100 Abandoning an approach of economic self-
reliance in an effort to stimulate domestic economic growth and raise the standard of living, the 
Chinese government took steps to decentralize the economy and established several economic 
zones to attract foreign investment, increase exports to other countries, and import advanced 
technology previously inaccessible in China.101 The goal of these reforms was to promote 
foreign trade and increase the productivity of the Chinese economy by gaining access to the 
trading architecture of the global economic system established under the liberal order. Above all, 
the reforms marked the beginning of a commitment by the Chinese leadership to modernizing the 
Chinese state through the opportunities of international trade. Doing so would require a drastic 
reconfiguration of China’s domestic institutions.  
Under Deng Xiaoping, the leadership of the People’s Republic of China adopted an 
integrationist approach to maximize its economic gains in the global liberal order. China 
reoriented domestic economic and political structures to stress greater conformity with 
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international norms already established by the United States and other market economies. 
China’s reforms culminated in its entrance to the World Trade Organization in 2001. Around the 
time when the GATT was reformed into the WTO (1993-94), China abolished export subsidies, 
published trade regulations, unified its foreign exchange value, and initiated progressive tariff 
reductions. Two stock exchanges were created in Shanghai(1990) and Shenzhen(1991), the legal 
framework for formal joint ventures was introduced to act as a vehicle for foreign investment, 
and the Company Law in 1993 began an era of legally defined corporations which stimulated the 
restructuring of the state sector into a shareholding system.102  The new development model in 
Shanghai pioneered by Zhu Rongji combined public investment in infrastructure with reduced 
transaction costs for private and international investors, demonstrating further conformity to the 
demands of China’s major trading partners in the WTO.103 In 1992, China agreed to the Market 
Access Agreement, giving the United States greater access to Chinese markets and exposing 
domestic industries to intensified foreign competition.104 The furthering of the 1978 reforms 
highlights the decision by China to continue implementing policies of adaptation to the 
capitalistic norms of the liberalized global economy as it pursued economic reform. 
All of these changes were made to meet the requirements of WTO membership.105 
Capitalist countries were specifically concerned about the role of the state in the economy and 
called for further opening of the Chinese goods and services market.106 In 1995, the United 
States gave China a memo listing areas of U.S. concern. Despite widespread Chinese reforms, 
the memo covered a variety of issues including tariffs, market access, trading rights, investment 
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policy, and China’s status as a developing country.107 The aforementioned issues framed the 
negotiation of concessions China needed to make before becoming a member of the WTO. In 
order to join the WTO, China would have to address the concerns in its bilateral trade 
relationship with the United States and other market economies. 
Continuing reforms to gain WTO membership was beneficial to the PRC in two ways. 
First, the WTO is dedicated to promoting trade and removing market barriers. WTO principles 
such as most favored nation (MFN) status help establish permanent, normal trade relations with 
other members and remove trade barriers that would make China’s economic strategy more 
effective. Therefore, China continued to employ a strategy that stressed adapting to foreign 
partners standards as it sought to meet economic interests and gain market access for its exports. 
Second, WTO membership provides China with a rule-based forum, the DSB, for dealing with 
an increasing number of bilateral trading problems with its partners.108 Designation as a non-
market economy (NME) and non-membership in the GATT/WTO subjected China to 
discriminatory measures such as “conditional MFN and discriminatory anti-dumping duties 
determined through third-country pricing” when dealing with issues in its bilateral trade 
relationships. This influenced China to accelerate its efforts to join the WTO. 
In addition to signing 60 legally binding agreements (like the GATT 1994, and TRIPs) 
the Chinese agreed to make multiple concessions to gain membership in the World Trade 
Organization.109 By the time it joined, China had radically reformed its legal, bureaucratic, and 
economic structures: 
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From 1979 to 2000, China adopted hundreds of laws and regulations to govern foreign 
economic relations. It established special courts and other dispute-resolution 
mechanisms…foreigner-friendly changes were made in banking, communications, 
transportation, and so on.110 
Following the terms of the Accession Agreement, the Chinese leadership repealed a number of 
laws inconsistent with WTO standards and accepted the task of now implementing these 
standards. As a member, China agreed to drastically lower tariff rates, remove a number of 
nontariff barriers (such as import and export licensing and quotas) to foreign imports, abolish 
subsidies for producers, allow foreign enterprises market access in sensitive areas, treat domestic 
and foreign products on the same terms, and improve its protection of intellectual property 
rights.111 
Given the trajectory of China’s economic growth, market economies feared China’s 
effect on their share of the global economy. To assuage fear of Chinese products dramatically 
reducing their global market share, China was also forced to agree to the Transitional product-
specific safeguard mechanism (TPSSM). The TPSSM allowed WTO members to impose import 
restrictions on China until December 2013 without meeting the standard set by the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards.112 Chan points out that the WTO Agreement on Safeguards allows for 
import restriction only when a country’s industry faces “serious injury”; the TPSSM allows 
WTO members to discriminate against Chinese products under the pretext of “market 
disruption”.113 Even so, China had to undergo review each year until 2010 under a Transitional 
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Review Mechanism (TRM) to evaluate the country’s compliance and implementation of the 
Accession Agreement.114 
Continued designation as a NME and the terms such as TPSSM and TRM attached to 
China’s Accession Agreement provide market economies like the United States with methods for 
taking action against the Chinese despite WTO membership. However, the Chinese leadership 
was not completely at the mercy of Western demands when acceding to the WTO. China was not 
forced to make the transition to a fully Westernized economy before gaining membership in one 
of the core institutions of the liberal international trading system. Instead, the Chinese economy 
drew on the strengths of global trade, complementing its national interest in developing the 
domestic market without compromising the role of the state in accomplishing this task. What 
emerged from China’s accession was a competitive economic model, both state-directed and 
globally marketized.115 
Examining China’s WTO Membership from an Alternative Perspective 
The literature pinpoints the elements of China’s distinct model known as the “Beijing 
Consensus” that developed out of its integration into the global economy. China’s economic 
model is characterized by five elements that emphasize the role of the state as a mediator in 
economic affairs. The Beijing Consensus promotes incremental reform rather than full market 
transition, innovation and experimentation, export-led growth, state capitalism, allocating 
resources to state-owned enterprises, and authoritarianism.116 As the Beijing Consensus shows, 
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the Chinese government pursues a strategy of passing various measures to manage the effects of 
globalization on domestic producers and consumers.  The Beijing Consensus is distinct from the 
Western model endorsed by the global liberal order known as the Washington Consensus, which 
emphasizes a free market approach rather than state planning. Since it is distinct from the liberal 
norm, the approach of the Beijing Consensus has created a tension between China and critical 
perspectives from the first school of thought that see its resistance to Westernization as a 
challenge to the global liberal order. Ka Zeng notes that Washington’s focus on Chinese 
industrial policy and the Chinese government’s continued support for domestic industries needs 
to be viewed against Beijing’s continued heavy involvement in the economy.117  
The United States has been the main instigator of disputes against China since its 
admission to the WTO in 2001. The United States Trade Representative claims the reason for 
bringing 15 cases to the WTO against China – more than twice the number brought against any 
other member – is to accomplish two goals: to bring about a resolution of the key trade issues in 
the U.S.-China trade relationship, and to influence the Chinese to act as a fully accountable and 
mature participant in the WTO trading system.118 However, it is important to remember that the 
benefits the U.S seeks from its trading relationship with China are an even more fundamental 
component of American policy towards China in the global economic realm. The USTR reports 
that a critical goal of American WTO policy, as it has always been, is “to vigorously pursue 
increased benefits for U.S. businesses, workers, farmers, ranchers and service providers from our 
trade and economic ties with China…the Administration will use all available tools to achieve 
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these objectives”.119 Whether it is China or the United States, a country’s national interest is at 
the heart of its foreign policy approach. That being said, the chapter will now shift to an 
alternative perspective for assessing China’s WTO membership. 
The first school of thought makes sweeping claims which may not be completely 
unfounded, but they are overly one sided by ignoring the context of the disputes involving China 
in the WTO. Gerald Chan interprets China’s entrance into the global liberal institution as one of 
the most peaceful developments of the post-Cold war era. Consideration of Chan’s assertion 
reveals a view that sees China’s accession as an instance of a rising power seeing its interests 
best being met by joining the institutionalized global order despite the competitive advantage of 
status quo actors. China’s membership in the World Trade Organization provides a platform for 
managing trading issues between status quo actors and the Chinese through the multilateral 
architecture of the international political system. In regards to the institutionalized framework 
China is rising into, analysis from the second school of thought on China’s relationship with the 
WTO seems to be correct. In contrast to the first school of thought, Luyten and Van Kerckhoven 
concludes there is very little evidence that China is disturbing the function of the WTO.120 From 
this perspective, Aaronson’s remarks seem to be overstated. China is not “breaking” the World 
Trade Organization, it is utilizing the institution to advance its own interests just like any other 
country. China’s interests in the area of international trade and investment are increasingly linked 
to acceptance and promotion of international norms.121  The disputes show China is doing more 
to improve its adherence to WTO standards while simultaneously retaining the Beijing 
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Consensus: in the 11 disputes that have been resolved, China has implemented all findings.122 
The WTO has provided the United States and China a basis for settling issues in their trading 
relationship in a constructive manner that allows the United States to leverage the Chinese 
government into developing its policies in accordance with the framework provided by the 
organization. These points illustrate the overall peaceful development of China, as a rising 
power, incorporating behavior that supports the foundation of the global economic system into 
its strategic interest. 
Since the Nixon-Mao rapprochement and the end of the Maoist period, China has 
undergone a transformation in its market structure to enter into the liberal order established by 
the United States. While Mao’s policy sought to avoid dependence on foreign markets and 
capital to retain China’s sovereignty in the domestic realm, Deng’s strategy called for China to 
draw upon the resources of the outside world by pursuing joint development and stressing 
conformity with the global economic framework.123 China’s transformation from ‘Maoism’ to 
‘Dengism’ leading up to acceptance of the obligations of WTO membership suggests willingness 
to participate in the liberal order, and the norms associated with global trade. China’s compliance 
with international norms can be better understood by looking at the disputes where these 
problems are raised. Taken as a whole, the disputes illustrate specific instances of China’s 
behavior in the context of the global liberal order’s strategic environment. An analysis of China’s 
relationship with the WTO examines the underlying dimensions to Aaronson’s claims by using 
specific disputes. The goal is to illustrate that China’s membership is not “killing” the World 
Trade Organization, but actually allowing the WTO to function to its intended purpose.  
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Aaronson concludes that a “broken China need not destroy the WTO”, but fails to 
consider the historical progression of China’s relationship into the international community and 
the roots of present day frictions. While the World Trade Organization is a Western constructed 
institution, Aaronson’s argument is largely built from a Western perspective and geared around 
the extent to which China’s WTO membership affects, and should serve, U.S. interests. In doing 
so, she fails to realize several components of the issue. The purpose of the World Trade 
Organization is to promote multilateralism and consider the broader interests and strategies of 
other member states. The WTO DSB provides China with a framework for adapting to the global 
environment, refining elements of the Beijing Consensus to make sure the economic strategy 
retains legitimacy in the eyes of China’s trading partners.  
Even though China is not supposed to receive full market economy (FME) status until 
2016, and Washington constantly attacks Beijing’s trading practices, over 51 countries including 
many of China’s regional partners such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations recognize 
China as a FME despite the hegemonic criterion of the “Washington Consensus”, the dominant 
economic strategy in the global liberal order.124 This suggests that other observers may not 
perceive China WTO membership in the same way as Aaronson’s school of thought. To the 
school of thought Gerald Chan falls under, China’s membership in the World Trade Organization 
is a positive development in the historical process of Chinese integration into the international 
community.  
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Aaronson’s understanding of China’s WTO membership leads her to believe that the 
international trading system is deteriorating, but Chan’s perspective argues that relations between 
actors in the global economic system are actually progressing in a positive direction due to 
conflict management being funneled towards the WTO. Not only does the WTO dispute 
settlement body allow for bilateral disputes to be resolved through third-party arbitration, but it 
also has guided China’s growth and foreign policy into compliance with international norms 
despite continued discrimination from other WTO members. In areas where tensions persist, the 
divergent interests of China and status quo actors like the United States are being effectively 
handled. The WTO DSB serves as an outlet for the U.S and China to deal with trade frictions and 
actively manage dispute in a way that transcends the “winner-take-all approach” of bilateral 
trade negotiations by providing third-party mediation to issues framed by the self-interest of 
individual actors.  
Dumping Charges and Discrimination 
Chan’s understanding of China’s WTO membership suggests that issues pertaining to 
disputes involving China may be more complex than the first school of thought lets on. Why 
might China enact anti-dumping restrictions against U.S. imports despite WTO rules? Since 
Chinese trade with the outside world has taken off, trading partners have repeatedly challenged 
the role of the Chinese state in the market. Chan illustrates the magnitude of the dumping issue in 
China’s bilateral relationships by noting that dumping charges against China have skyrocketed. 
Before 1979, China’s exports accounted for less than $10 billion and no dumping charges had 
been levied against the country. Between 1979 and 2005 when Chan’s book was published, 33 
countries had initiated a total of 544 investigations and taken unilateral action against 4,000 
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Chinese export products.125 China’s accession protocol allows members to initiate anti-dumping 
investigations without strictly comparing domestic prices in China when the Chinese producers 
under investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the 
industry.126 This puts the dumping disputes in the post-2008 period in perspective. Utilizing 
methods condoned by the World Trade Organization, status quo actors in the global liberal order 
can enact policies against China to protect their economies from Chinese competition and benefit 
their domestic industries, even though China is a WTO member. 
Countries enact dumping investigations against China on the basis that it is exporting its 
lesser-quality products to foreign markets at a lower price than it costs to manufacture them, 
providing Chinese products with a competitive advantage over their own products. When taking 
a moment to reflect upon what dumping a product actually means, one may question why any 
rational actor would strategically export products at a loss. The reason dumping investigations 
are frequently filed against China is that state directed capitalism subsidizes part of the costs for 
crucial domestic industries, much to the dissatisfaction of other market economies. China’s non 
market economy (NME) status and the contours of its Accession (TPSSM) make it easy to file 
and win dumping disputes against China.127 By pairing anti-dumping investigations with 
countervailing duties charges that target Chinese subsidy programs, the United States and 
successfully used the WTO DSB to force China to remove market barriers in recent years, such 
as in Disputes 414 and 427. 
Meanwhile, the market economies restrict Chinese products from entering their own 
markets. In addition to utilizing the framework of the World Trade Organization to target aspects 
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of the Beijing Consensus, countries conduct investigations and take action against China to 
“level the playing field”. The reason is that there is a large payoff for a country that accuses 
China of dumping. Even though China is now entitled to the benefits of WTO membership, the 
WTO Antidumping Agreement allows members to continue to unilaterally enact policy against 
China if a country accuses China of dumping products.128 Countries can accuse China of 
illegitimate trading practices without having to verify the legitimacy of their claims to the WTO, 
so that they can enact safeguards and extract concessions through “import relief measures”, 
otherwise known as higher tariffs, against products from Chinese industries. For instance, in 
2009 the Obama administration enacted safeguards against Chinese tires to restrict their import 
in response to complaints from the U.S. Steelworkers Union.129 The national self-interest of 
China’s trading partners is part of the reason why the Chinese government is frequently targeted 
in dumping disputes. China’s utilization of import restrictions in Disputes 414, 427 and 440 
against the United States can be explained as a reaction to discriminatory practices against 
Chinese products that China still faces from foreign markets despite WTO membership. China’s 
historical and present day role as a scapegoat for dumping charges explains its utilization of the 
same measures employed by WTO members against Chinese products. 
Despite Aaronson’s claims of inadequate governance, China’s has developed its 
institutional abilities to deal with charges, emphasizing a willingness to conform to international 
standards. Upon WTO admission, China established the Fair Trade Bureau of Imports and 
Exports with eight offices and forty staff members. The FTB is a sub-organization of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), the administrative channel 
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that oversaw the bilateral and multilateral negotiations of the MFN process critical to China’s 
WTO membership. Since Chinese companies are frequently accused of dumping, the FTB serves 
the purpose of directing those companies’ response to dumping charges.130 Given MOFTEC’s 
continued engagement with trade issues like dumping over the years, the creation of the Fair 
Trade Bureau shows the Chinese government’s intent to effectively deal with dumping charges 
and address resulting discriminatory policies filed by trading partners.131 China’s strategic 
development of domestic institutions demonstrates conformity to international norms, but also 
shows how doing so can dissuade the global trading community from slighting China’s national 
interest.  
Not only does China actively seek to manage the dumping problem on its own accord, 
but it has followed the recommendations of the WTO dispute settlement body when the 
international community has challenged its reactive strategy. After both Dispute 414 and Dispute 
427, China implemented the DSB resolutions, pointing to compliance with DSB findings and 
international obligations. In the long run, this suggests that the Beijing Consensus can coexist 
with the liberal order if China actively continues to implement changes in the domestic realm to 
meet the standard enunciated by the DSB and adjust protectionist policies. At the same time, 
China can utilize the WTO DSB to critique members of the WTO that are guilty of similar 
practices. 
Western Protectionism  
Evaluating China’s role in antidumping measures, countervailing duties, wind power 
subsidies, along with the raw materials and rare earths disputes, the United States Trade 
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Representative report in 2013 asserted that China’s polices “limit market access for imported 
goods, foreign manufacturers and foreign service suppliers”, while offering “substantial 
government guidance, resources and regulatory support to Chinese industries”.132 However, the 
United States has also restricted Chinese market access and provides benefits and a competitive 
advantage to its own industries by enacting safeguards against Chinese exports, such as in the 
aforementioned U.S Steel dispute.133  This is a clear illustration of safeguard measures being 
taken by the U.S. to limit the access of the NME designated China in the American market.  
Like the dumping issue, Chinese protectionism should be considered in light of the 
foreign barriers China often encounters in the international trading arena. The U.S. and EU 
markets utilize a number of environmental barriers against the Chinese to prevent Chinese 
products from gaining access to their markets. Chinese exporters must comply with international 
and foreign environmental standards and regulations to export their products. Yet, China is still 
developing the capacity of its domestic institutions and Chinese exporters are still acquiring the 
capabilities to meet international standards.134 In the raw materials dispute initiated in 2009, 
China cited the reason for its export restrictions was to “reduce pollution” and “protect human 
health” while seeking to moderate the export of exhaustible natural resources.135 Chinese 
rhetoric implies an understanding of established norms in the liberal international system and 
could even point to a strategy of justifying protectionist policies using the same jargon of 
“green” language utilized by Western countries. China’s justification, to be abiding by 
international environmental standards, suggests a reactive strategy to deal with barriers it faces in 
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other markets and discriminatory measures it has often been subjected to. 
Even though China’s restrictions are in part reactive to continued discrimination, it is 
even more fundamental to consider how national interests frame the behavior of members in 
multilateral institutions. Like its trading partners, China is trying to strike a balance between 
economic nationalism and globalism in its approach to the international economy, arguing that 
other major countries intervene in trade through financial and industrial policies too.136 Even if 
states participate in multilateral institutions, national interest dominates the considerations of 
actors in the international political-economic system and frames the underlying aims of a 
country’s policy.  
Regardless of varying perceptions of China’s intentions in the disputes, China’s 
compliance with WTO rulings in the aftermath of each dispute suggests that the country is still 
integrating within the global economic system while developing the capacity to advance its 
national interest in the established framework of the global economic system. After the DSB 
ruled on China-Raw materials, China removed export restraints on several raw material inputs of 
key interest to the U.S. steel, aluminum and chemicals industries after the United States won a 
dispute settlement case against China at the WTO.137 Furthermore, in 2010 when the United 
States brought a case to the WTO on China’s subsidization of wind power equipment, the PRC 
ended state subsidies before the DSB Panel was established.138 In 2014 when the China-rare 
earths dispute was settled, China stated that it would implement the recommendations of the 
DSB in a manner consistent with its WTO obligations.  
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Developing an Intellectual Property Rights Regime in China 
China’s decision to implement WTO rulings in each of the aforementioned disputes 
suggests that the 2008 disputes are not as severe as Aaronson makes them out to be. In fact, they 
suggest a more evident trend of China’s development and strategy being influenced by 
international norms. A progressive management of disputes with deep historical roots through 
the WTO suggests that China is developing its domestic system to stress greater conformity with 
international norms since joining the organization in 2001. For example, the issue of intellectual 
property rights has historically been important in the U.S-Sino relationship, and it provides a way 
of judging the bureaucratic efficacy of the PRC. Since intellectual property rights were 
considered common property under Mao, China has had to build a legal and bureaucratic 
structure to support IPR norms from scratch. The Chinese government followed U.S advice by 
enacting laws and regulations to bring its domestic structure in line with outside standards. 
However, corruption, an inadequate legal system, and local protectionism generated friction over 
Chinese efficacy. Despite overall American benefits resulting from Chinese trade, the United 
States has threatened China multiple times (in 1991,1994, and 1996) with trade sanctions if it did 
not pay for the costs of piracy.139 
In 2007, the United States filed a complaint through the WTO dispute settlement body 
known as China-Intellectual Property Rights, citing measures by the Chinese that were 
inconsistent with the guidelines of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), a key WTO agreement.140 Signatories must protect a variety of information including 
“patents, copyrights and trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs and trade 
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secrets”.141 Agreeing to adopt TRIPS upon accession called for China to develop the proper legal 
and institutional structures. Furthermore, signing the TRIPS agreement called for the Chinese 
government to assume the responsibility of confiscating pirated goods and imposing civil and 
criminal penalties costly enough to deter actors within the Chinese border from committing 
piracy.142 
According to the China-IPR summary, the U.S. pursued consultation on the matter based 
on concerns over the institutional effectiveness of the IPR regime in China. In its complaint, the 
United States claimed the Chinese criminal system lacked an adequate threshold for enforcing 
the regulations of intellectual property rights, and the Chinese bureaucracy failed to implement 
TRIPS obligations regarding the confiscation of goods unauthorized for commercial sale within 
China.143 The conclusions reached by the dispute settlement body were mixed. On the one hand, 
China was found guilty on issues of copyright protection and in regards to confiscation and 
disposal of unauthorized goods. However, the DSB noted that the U.S. assertion that China did 
not have an adequate threshold for handling criminal practices in its domestic system had no 
basis. Rather than reaching a one-sided conclusion, the dispute settlement body utilized the 
TRIPS to scrutinize the legality of each American claim. The DSB did not support the U.S. claim 
that China had not taken measures to establish an adequate threshold for dealing with practices 
of IPR infringement.144 While the IPR regime is not as strong in China as the standard set by 
advanced economies and the WTO, the DSB’s resolution supports the idea that China has taken 
steps to create institutions for implementing international norms.  
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Contrary to U.S claims, the Department for WTO Affairs and reforms made in the 
Chinese legal system since engagement began are two illustrations of the Chinese state’s active 
role in creating necessary institutions. Established in 2001, the Department of WTO Affairs is 
responsible for making sure that China carries out its promises to WTO Agreements on Goods 
and Services. Although it is a relatively new institution, the Department of WTO Affairs is 
another sub-organ of MOFTEC. The Department has six offices and 48 staff members dedicated 
to instituting domestic laws in line with WTO principles.145 The institution’s purpose can be 
directly applied in the IPR case, but also demonstrates a broader picture of China developing the 
domestic capabilities to implement international standards. 
The Chinese leadership makes an effort to meet the expectations of WTO standards, and 
the initiation of the dispute illustrates that there is room for long-term improvement. The DSB 
found China’s Copyright Law and Customs Measures to be inconsistent with the TRIPS 
agreement and recommended that China conform its Copyright Law and Customs Measures to 
those obligations.146 China was given 12 months to implement proper domestic changes. 
According to the report, the Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s Congress 
approved amendments to the Chinese Copyright Law on March 19, 2010, and the State Council 
adopted a decision to reform the Regulations for Customs Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights.147 Three years after the dispute was initiated, both countries notified the DSB of the 
Agreed Procedures on April 8 2010.  
China has not been challenged on willingness to abide by TRIPS through the WTO since 
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the dispute. The WTO DSB played an active role in resolving a prominent issue in China’s 
bilateral trading relationships. While China is compelled to implement DSB findings, WTO 
membership also provided China with political protection from the U.S taking unilateral action 
to resolve the issue. Whereas Chinese reluctance to uphold WTO agreements can be argued in 
the raw material and rare earth disputes, it looks like China is supporting intellectual property 
right norms despite American skepticism. This case suggests an increase in China’s support for 
international norms since 2008. As the country modernizes further, the Chinese economy will 
move beyond the export-led growth model and come to resemble other advanced economies.148 
Innovation in the Chinese economy will make upholding intellectual property norms increasingly 
important to the country’s national interest. A variety of Chinese officials, businesses and 
academics have engaged in high frequency dialogue with the Global Intellectual Property Center 
and U.S. intellectual property experts to build an effective legal and regulatory framework for 
intellectual property rights.149 All of these signs point to management of trading issues by the 
Chinese leadership occurring within the context of its WTO membership. In an instance of the 
WTO functioning effectively, Aaronson’s claims of China “breaking” the WTO do not seem to 
hold up.150 China has accepted implementing intellectual property rights, and accomplishing this 
task will require continued engagement by the state.  Greater coordination by the central 
leadership and local governments to address issues such as corruption and bridging the gap 
between legal and regulatory standards will lead to constructive handling of the challenges 
related to the international community’s expectations. 
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China’s Utilization of the Dispute Settlement Body 
Authors from the first school of thought see an increase in litigation being filed by China 
as signs of an aggressive strategy. The second school of thought argues that it signals conflict 
management. Utilizing the WTO dispute settlement body provides members with a means to 
compromising issues in bilateral trading relationships through a third-party institution. 
International norms are developed in multilateral contexts that involve large numbers of 
countries, and decisions are made by consensus. Third party, international legal bodies like the 
WTO Dispute Resolution Mechanism enunciate the specific standards of the norm regime in the 
international trading system.151 Disputes are initiated when a country’s domestic industry is 
negatively affected by the policies of another state, typically as a result of suspected 
noncompliance with WTO agreements. As the disputes show, utilizing the World Trade 
Organization can force China to comply with the DSB’s findings if it is found guilty and 
provides a release valve for China’s trading partners to vent frustrations.152 China has also 
benefitted from membership by gaining a voice in an international institution to defend its 
interests when Western countries criticize Chinese policies based on their own-self interest and 
conceptions of how its economic system should work. Because this is the system China is 
joining, one component of its strategy is reacting to the tendency of the United States and its 
allies to continuously target the China’s economic strategy despite its WTO membership. The 
importance is that the dynamic is contained by the WTO. 
As the chapter shows, China is willing to implement WTO DSB rulings when found 
guilty. Therefore, it is extreme to state that “China has evolved from a passive ‘taker’ of the 
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existing rules to a country that will ‘shake‘ the rules for its own interests.153 China has been in 
the position of disadvantage since it began integration and has been faced with the task of 
learning the rules of the “game” in the international arena. There is an institutionalized set of 
norms China must appear to be in line with when pursuing its national interest. However, China 
can utilize the WTO DSB to serve and defend its national interest. Just like any other WTO 
member, China is entitled to utilize the WTO DSB when it perceives the policies of other actors 
are causing harm to the Chinese economy, despite the fact that the first school of thought 
interprets China’s dispute initiation as a sign of aggression. While China will follow most of the 
rules, it will also seek to master the intricacies of the WTO ruling system to protect its 
interests.154   
 China has increasingly resorted to utilizing the WTO as a way of critiquing the United 
States on its own terms. China has initiated charges only against the United States and EU, and 
an overwhelming share of the disputes where China is the complainant have involved it charging 
the U.S. and EU with comparable complaints such as dumping that have been persistent in the 
trading relationship155. Recall the Fair Trade Bureau of Imports and Exports. The office is 
responsible for investigating imports and determining whether anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, or 
protective measures are applicable to foreign products.  After joining the WTO, China is now 
able to utilize its legal framework to advance a claim at the WTO to determine if trading partners 
are engaging in dumping practices or if foreign countries are enforcing discriminatory policies 
on Chinese products inconsistent with WTO obligations. The purpose is ensuring that Chinese 
companies enjoy fair trade in the global economy despite repeated castigation over industrial 
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policy from the United States and other market economies. In a joint dispute filed in 2002 on US 
safeguard measures against the importation of steel products, China and several other countries 
found the U.S. actions to be inconsistent with its WTO obligations. Other than that, China dealt 
with most of its disputes bilaterally prior to 2007, but has increased its utilization of the WTO 
DSB.156 There are several reasons why this might be. 
China joined the World Trade Organization to gain the benefits of partaking in a 
multilateral institution and seeks to change the rules of the system as much as it seeks to obey 
them.157 China’s NME status and the various terms of the Accession Protocol are a handicap in 
many of the disputes. The WTO allows China to press for reform of anti-dumping rules and 
protectionist policies within the established framework of the global liberal order. One way it can 
do this is through initiating disputes. The course of behavior by member states influences the 
evolution of the international norm regimes in the global liberal order. From trade and finance, 
navigation, dispute resolution, arms control, migration, human rights, climate change and 
environmentalism to more specialized issues like intellectual property rights, “regimes” 
encompass the many facets of the international political system.158 States are diverse and adopt a 
variety of different strategies to fulfill their national objectives and appease domestic 
constituencies. There is constant tension between states whose actions point to responsibly 
abiding by the rules of the regime versus those whose strategy is not seen as consistent with 
behavioral norms of the liberal status quo. The WTO DSB provides China with a voice within 
the system to both defend itself and challenge other members. 
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One year after joining the WTO Sun Zhenyu stated, “China will build the World Trade 
Organization into an open, fair, transparent, and rational mechanism”.159 China is pursuing 
assertive, rather than aggressive, legalism.  Aggressive legalism implies unjustified behavior 
while assertive legalism acknowledges the established structure and is challenging the United 
States based on the legality of its policies. China is challenging Western dominance in 
international institutions, not the structure of the global liberal order. The disputes show China 
has taken a “tit-for-tat” approach to solving its problems with the United States and EU by 
identifying their hypocritical behavior.160 China’s complaints are specifically targeting 
discriminatory and dumping practices market economy countries are also guilty of 
committing.161  For instance, China formally requested WTO consultations in 2009 on the issue 
of Chinese chicken sanitary restrictions in the U.S., which began in 2007. Using the language of 
multilateralism, China stated that the U.S. violated national treatment clauses and certain 
sections of WTO sanitary agreements. That same year, China launched anti-dumping 
investigations into American firms exporting chicken parts unpopular in the U.S. market to 
China, where they are considered delicacies. China argued this, in turn, adversely affects Chinese 
poultry farmers and causes injury to its domestic industries.162 China is using the structure of the 
World Trade Organization to point out how the United States is guilty of the same practices its 
accuses China of. 
Disputes have risen as China has been gradually increasing its ability to utilize the WTO 
framework. In addition to developing new domestic institutions to implement WTO standards, 
China has pursued multiple avenues to learn about the World Trade Organization. Given the fact 
                                                        
159 Chan, 79. 
160 Van Kerckhoven and Luyten, 205-206. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Zeng, 367. 
 Farrell 63 
that the WTO is an entirely new experience to the Chinese, China has dedicated a number of 
resources to adapting and learning the structure to utilize it to its interests. China has taken a 
number of steps in the international and domestic realms.163 The PRC established a Division of 
WTO Law with access to in-house lawyers who have WTO legal experience to advise Chinese 
strategy. China has also built consulting networks of professionals to build a foundation of 
expertise. And, to manage disputes at the World Trade Organization, China instituted a WTO 
Chapter in Geneva.164 China’s investment in institutions geared towards learning about the 
World Trade Organization points to a long-term interest in managing its relationship with the 
global economic order. Increased litigation could be a result of “learning” about the WTO 
structure and developing its capacity to file complaints against the U.S. and EU. 
A third angle of the increased litigation issue is that China, like the United States, must 
consider domestic constituencies when approaching its relationship with the World Trade 
Organization. Conservative factions in China constantly question the extent to which Deng 
Xiaoping’s reform strategy allows foreign countries to impact Chinese sovereignty. They remain 
skeptical of the need for China to accept further obligations of the global liberal order by being a 
member of a Western created, liberal institution like the World Trade Organization. When China 
joined the WTO, Huang Yasheng argued that membership would bring about foreign 
encroachment.165 From critical domestic perspectives, China’s NME and aspects of the 
Accession protocol like the TPSSM restrict China from receiving fair and equal treatment in the 
Western oriented world and subject China’s national decision-making policies to foreign 
interference.  To be sure, these critics are justified in their claims, as the Chinese government has 
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found the extent to which it can strategically intervene in trade policy limited by WTO 
Agreements, the Accession Protocol, and the ability of trading partners to utilize the DSB against 
China. As the increase in disputes in the post-2008 period shows, the leadership can initiate 
disputes through the WTO DSB in response to scrutiny against China. Doing so helps appease 
domestic concerns by demonstrating that China can achieve its national interests through the 
WTO and is not completely at the mercy of Western exploitation when partaking in liberal 
institutions.  
Control over the relationship China has with the outside world is central to foreign 
policy. Historically speaking, China has prioritized the protection of national sovereignty as its 
primary foreign policy objective.166 Another reason China is learning about the WTO is so that it 
can legally defend the legitimacy of the Beijing Consensus in the international realm so it 
maintains the role that the state plays in controlling the effects of globalization in China. This is 
an essential part in appeasing domestic constituencies. The incident at Tiananmen Square in 
1989 is a focal point for understanding the role of the state in China’s economic strategy in the 
global liberal order.  
A crucial element that informs China’s foreign policy is retaining control over internal 
affairs. Social unrest at Tiananmen in 1989 threatened domestic stability, and riding the tide of 
globalization reached a crossroads for the Chinese leadership. For the conservative faction within 
the Party, the incident at Tiananmen Square represented the destabilizing effects of opening the 
country to foreign influence and was an indicator that opening could lead China’s sovereignty to 
be compromised by the outside world. China must maintain the role of the state in mediating the 
effects of globalization to appease conservative factions within the Party, but more importantly 
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to deal with the concerns of Chinese society as a whole. While an upsurge in liberal thinking had 
some influence on the Tiananmen incident, the protests were deeply rooted in economic 
problems. China’s adaptation to the global economy led to fluctuations in the domestic market 
that contributed to the development of social disparity. Workers and peasants in China 
experienced price inflation and protested the negative impact reforms had on individuals who did 
not directly benefit from the reforms like Party elites and the business class. In the aftermath of 
Tiananmen Square, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Western Financial Crisis in 2008 
the importance of the Chinese government controlling the effects of global economic distortion 
on its domestic population has been reinforced. To deal with these challenges, it is crucial that 
the Chinese government continue to refine the Beijing Consensus to retain the legitimacy of its 







Chapter 3: China and the South China Sea 
This chapter is about identifying and engaging the evidence for alternative interpretations 
of China’s foreign policy based on developments in the South China Sea (SCS). Intensified 
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conflict in the South China Sea raise questions about China’s militarization and multilateralism. 
Observers with varying perspectives on the issue note developments in the South China Sea that 
can be fit into two competing categories. The dominant outlooks on the nature of the 
international political system frame the two categories. The first sees the world as being 
characterized by great power competition. Here, the focus is on negative trends in the South 
China Sea and aggressive Chinese behavior. The second downplays frictions’ likelihood to lead 
to conflict, emphasizing the stability of the global liberal order’s institutional framework. In this 
outlook, the focus is on understanding elements of Chinese foreign policy and strategic 
environment. Both categories offer a vision of China’s future role in the international system and 
shed light on the impact China will have on international norms. 
China refuses international arbitration on the disputes in the South China Sea, citing 
longstanding historical claims as a basis for its sovereignty over the South China Sea. However, 
international law does not recognize China’s sovereignty over the SCS due to competing claims 
by other states. Despite the unresolved nature of the SCS debate, China has been extensively 
pursuing construction in disputed areas. At the same time, reports state that China apparently is 
restricting other countries’ ships from the area. For the first school of thought, this information 
suggests China is acting as noncompliant actor within the global liberal order undermining 
multilateral dispute resolution. As a result of China’s suspected challenge to status quo norms, 
questions have been raised about the strategic objective of China’s increasing power projection 
capabilities in the South China Sea. In 2010, there were supposed reports that a Chinese official 
made a remark about the South China Sea being a “core interest”, implying China will use 
military force if necessary to enforce its interests over the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) member states’ competing claims. This is inherently contradictory to the 
 Farrell 67 
liberal order constructed by the United States. In response to China’s allegedly irresponsible 
behavior, Hilary Clinton expressed the United States’ interest in freedom of navigation and 
willingness to intervene in the dispute.  China responded by saying the dispute is not of 
American concern and that the United States has no say in the South China Sea. Authors that 
focus on China’s unilateral behavior have gone as far as describing China’s strategy in the SCS 
as “a fundamental challenge to the international order the United States has tried to preserve 
since the end of the Cold War”.167 Observers who see the world as being conflict prone interpret 
negative trends in China’s handling of the dispute to suggest the country’s ongoing military 
modernization is offensively orientated. This segment of the literature emphasizes the potential 
for military conflict to erupt in the international political system and believes China ultimately 
seeks the military capabilities to defeat the United States and intimidate actors in the Asian 
region. 
On the other side of the debate, authors utilize a different approach for interpreting 
China’s activity in the South China Sea. These observers deemphasize the confrontational 
elements of China’s foreign policy, raising evidence of China’s positive integration into 
multilateral structures and utilizing formal statements and documents from the PRC. They note 
developing trends such as the diplomatic ties fostered by joint development and cooperation 
through diplomatic forums that have strengthened the relationship between China and the 
international community. Whereas peace and stability through the first perspective is 
deteriorating as a result of China’s increasing presence on the sea, authors from this school of 
thought put forth evidence to make the argument that disputes are being effectively managed and 
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operate on a presumption that all countries seek to avoid conflict. Similar to the first perspective, 
this school of thought looks at the world in a certain way. It deemphasizes alarm over events in 
the South China Sea. Peace and stability is enduring and has actually historically progressed 
despite claims of China’s confrontational behavior. China does not seek to provoke military 
conflict with the United States or use its military to actively subdue its smaller neighbors. A less 
malicious interpretation of China’s behavior leads these authors to believe the strategic intentions 
of China’s militarization in the South China Sea are limited. These observers state that China’s 
military modernization is defensive and cite China’s military integration into the multilateral 
structure of the global liberal order. 
Sorting supporting evidence from multiple authors into categories is one method for 
analyzing concerns over China’s strategy. This chapter will look at China’s behavior in the South 
China Sea from two angles to frame the debate around the character of China’s approach to 
multilateralism and militarization. The chapter will introduce evidence from both schools of 
thought derived from China’s action in the SCS to examine Chinese foreign policy. This method 
also grounds conclusions based on China’s foreign policy approach and future impact on the 
international political system by synthesizing the information and speculation provided by each 
of the competing schools of thought. Doing so displays both positive and negative developments 
in the South China Sea and helps weigh the arguments against each another. 
The Importance of the South China Sea 
The South China Sea is dotted with small islands, shoals, reefs, and sandbars. The 
Spratly, Paracel, and Pratas island groupings and Scarborough Shoal are some of the major 
features focused on in the debate, along with about 400 other minor features. Regional actors 
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involved in the South China Sea dispute are China (People's Republic of 
China), the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Singapore. Since the 
1970’s all of these states have been involved in ongoing conflict over their competing postures 
and actions in the South China Sea.168 China’s increased activity in the South China Sea has 
generated extensive and complicated disputes over the sovereignty of islands, their related 
territorial waters, and derived exclusive economic zones (EEZ). A country legitimately seen as 
having jurisdiction over the disputed islands and outcroppings is entitled to exploitation rights of 
the resources in any given EEZ under prescription from UNCLOS. 
The South China Sea is one of the most strategically and economically important bodies 
of water in the world for three reasons: trade, natural resources, and fishing.169 Sea-lanes in the 
South China Sea are heavily used for conducting trade and are crucial to enduring economic 
prosperity in the liberal order: 5.3 trillion dollars worth of goods passes through the SCS each 
year.170 Second, the South China Sea historically has served as fishing grounds to countries in 
the surrounding area: with modern fishing technology, the sea yields more than 10 million fish 
per year.171 Most importantly, since countries began exploration of the area in the 1970’s, vast 
reserves of oil and gas are believed to be contained in the seabed of the South China Sea: the US 
Energy Administration speculates that there is 11 billion dollars worth of oil and 190 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas exist in the SCS.172 Rowan states that the region retains proven oil 
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reserves of seven billion barrels and a production capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day.173  
Is China Undermining International Norms in the South China Sea? 
China has defied arbitration in the South China Sea aimed at peacefully resolving the 
conflict through the global liberal order’s dispute resolution mechanisms.174 The Philippines and 
Vietnam have both submitted evidence for their sovereignty claims to the Hague Tribunal this 
past year, while China states that any ruling by the international court is illegitimate and that it 
will not participate in the tribunal.175 China refuses to “internationalize” the dispute, stating that 
it holds sole sovereignty in the area and that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea has no jurisdiction over territorial claims.176 A similar example of China’s refusal to 
cooperate with international tribunals was seen in 2009 when Vietnam and Malaysia submitted a 
joint complaint to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, arguing for their 
sovereignty over the southern part of the South China Sea: China’s response was a picture of the 
nine-dotted line line.177 Contrary to integrating with multilateral institutional which contribute to 
peace, the PRC insists any settlement on the South China Sea should be a bilateral rather than 
through settlement by an international tribunal. China’s attitude is that its claim predates United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was agreed to in 1982 and came 
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into force in 1994, and that it should be adjusted to accommodate historical rights.178 The first 
school of thought believes China’s unwillingness to compromise on the South China Sea issue 
will lead it to aggressively assert its position in the area, undermining the framework of the 
global liberal order. China’s defiance of multilateral dispute resolution raises concerns about its 
commitment to the status quo of the liberal order.179 
Restricting Freedom of Navigation 
China’s defiant attitude towards solving the South China Sea dispute through multilateral 
dispute resolution is paired with evidence of provocative behavior. Various reports of Chinese 
action serve as a platform for believing China ultimately seeks to challenge the framework of the 
global liberal order in the South China Sea. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) is the core maritime agreement of the global liberal order. As Simon states, 
international waters are  “ostensibly governed by international law”, and agreements like 
UNCLOS provides a framework for actors’ conduct in the South China Sea.180 However, 
Western media reports and citations from the scholarly literature suggest China has an interest in, 
and is increasingly capable of, governing the South China Sea on its own terms even though it is 
a member of UNCLOS.  
The official stance of the Chinese government is enumerated in a letter sent to the UN 
secretary general in 2010. The letter states that China is entitled to a “’Territorial Sea’ extending 
22 kilometers from the baselines of the Spratly Islands and an EEZ out to 370 kilometers from 
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these baselines”.181 The claim is illustrated by the nine-dotted line line (NDL), which 
encompasses 90% of the South China Sea. China has not backed down from the NDL claim 
despite the interests of ASEAN states and United States concern over freedom of navigation, 
enduring peace and stability, and multilateral conflict resolution. In doing so, China is 
undermining several principles of the global liberal order. 
        The first example of China’s noncompliance with established principles of the global 
liberal order has to do with freedom of navigation. There are multiple cases of China enacting 
and/or enforcing policies that restrict the activities of other actors in the region. The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) imposed annual fishing bans from 2009-2012 in the waters 
surrounding the Paracel Islands where other ASEAN states such as Vietnam also claim 
sovereignty.182 There is evidence that China is actively seeking to enforce unilateral fishing bans. 
China has increased maritime patrols and has not been afraid of arresting fishermen from 
countries like Vietnam with competing claims in the South China Sea.183 
        China’s assertiveness is also seen in the conflict over oil and gas exploration in waters 
surrounding the disputed islands but also in regions closer to the coasts of Vietnam and the 
Philippines, although still within China’s NDL. A growing reliance on energy resources to fuel 
economic growth has been used to explain China’s unilateral aggressiveness in this area of the 
conflict, even though energy resources are critical to the interest of all countries involved in the 
South China Sea region. Hong and Jiang note that “China’s thirst for oil is pushing its search and 
its claims further and further offshore, and in the process it is both rubbing up against its 
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neighbors and competing with them for the resources of the sea”.184 In 2011, China expelled an 
oil exploration vessel under contract with the Philippines’ government from the Reed Bank near 
the Spratly islands. Later that same year, there were two incidents involving Chinese maritime 
surveillance ships severing the seismic cables of Vietnamese ships operating in the Cam Ranh 
Bay. Just a month later it happened again near the coast of Vietnam, which is especially alarming 
given the fact that this occurred within what UNCLOS defines as Vietnam’s exclusive economic 
zone.185  
Unilateral Action 
Chinese assertiveness is not only cited in how the state restricts freedom of navigation of 
other SCS actors, but also in is its unilateral construction in contested waters that exacerbates 
tensions with other claimants. China occupies various features in the South China Sea, and in the 
post-2008 period has been upgrading and expanding its regional deployments. China’s 
infrastructural activity may be an indicator that the country seeks to build its power projection 
capabilities in the region to back its claims. There are numerous examples of increased, 
expansive activity by China in the SCS. China upgraded its facilities on Mischief Reef from 
“fisherman structures” when first settled in 1995, to improved buildings with suspected military-
administrative purposes.186 Surveillance photos show similar activity by Beijing beyond the 
Spratly Islands chain, and recent reports state that China has accelerated construction on about 6 
disputed areas. For example, Chinese naval ships have been unloading concrete blocks on the 
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Scarborough Shoal to supposedly build a landing strip for aircrafts.187  In some cases, China is 
using dredging vessels to create artificial landmasses, all with the assumed intent to create 
barracks, airstrips, and radar sites.188 China has constructed a naval base on the island of Hainan 
capable of housing “submarine and surface combatants” including large frigates and destroyers 
over 1000 nautical miles away from the Chinese mainland.189 China further bolstered its 
presence in the South China Sea by establishing local government bodies on Woody Island in 
2009.190 Another author notes that China’s unilateral assertion of its indisputable sovereignty 
over the SCS and strategy of territorial expansion led China to put a billion dollar oil rig just 130 
miles off the coast of Vietnam, challenging both competing claims of its five neighbors over the 
NDL and U.S. efforts at rebalancing in the region.191 
Provoking Conflict 
The evidence above suggests China is disregarding liberal order norms by restricting 
freedom of navigation while pursuing its territorial claims within the nine-dotted line line. One 
author notes that since 2008, China changed its general approach and is pushing more actively its 
claims on natural resources, both living and nonliving, in the whole area enclosed by the nine-
dotted line.192 In light of this, several commentators focus on China’s aggressive behavior when 
enforcing its posture in the SCS and defending its claims. This focus in the debate reveals China 
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may challenge status quo norms and threaten the relative peace and stability of the liberal order 
by provoking conflict. A writer for CBS notes that while protecting its claims in the South China 
Sea in 2013, Beijing rammed and sank a Vietnam fishing vessel in waters Vietnam and the 
Philippines both claim sovereignty over.193 Incidents between China and Indonesia also have 
occurred. In June 2010, a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel pointed a large-caliber machine 
gun at an Indonesian craft in the southern part of the South China Sea.194 In 2011, a Chinese 
warship instructed Philippine fishing boats to leave the eastern part of the South China Sea 
immediately and to cease operating in Chinese territory.195 This antagonistic behavior in all 
regions of the South China exacerbates the chances of conflict between China and ASEAN 
states. 
China’s aggressive activity towards actors in the SCS is not limited to smaller ASEAN 
states, but has also interfered with naval surveillance by the United States in Asia. The 
Impeccable incident in March 2009 suggests China is willing to enforce its position in the South 
China Sea even over American vessels operating in the region. Five Chinese ships surrounded 
and harassed the US Navy vessel from waters near Hainan Island, claiming it to be in violation 
of both Chinese domestic, and international, law.196 Tim Keating, an admiral from the U.S 
Pacific Command, interpreted the Impeccable incident as a “troubling indicator” that China is 
not willing to “abide by the acceptable standards of behavior or rules of the world” in reference 
to freedom of navigation.197 Smaller incidents could ignite into military conflict between China 
and its Southeast Asian neighbors and even the United States. In response to Chinese aggression 
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in 2009, the US Senate passed a resolution that protested China’s “use of force” in the South 
China Sea, sending a signal from Washington to China about its aggressiveness being at odds 
with liberal order norms.198 
Chinese Militarization 
Citations of Chinese unilateralism and nonconformity in the South China Sea give 
substantial support for theoretical scenarios concerned with how the PRC’s military 
modernization could negatively affect stability in the international political system.  Hysteria 
arises from commentators who see present day trends in Chinese foreign policy and interpret the 
rise of China through Mearsheimer’s theory of international politics.199 The keys to China’s 
national security are power projection and a robust military to back assertions and the PRC’s 
primary strategic consideration as it defends its claims in the South China Sea. Authors that 
operate from this angle view China as a unitary actor maximizing its power and influence in an 
uncertain world, highlight the growth in Chinese military and naval forces, and point to China's 
growing reliance on offshore energy resources to fuel its modernization. This evidence 
demonstrates that China’s rise will diverge from liberal order norms in the long run as it pursues 
its interests. 
China’s rise may cause friction with the liberal order through its military buildup, which 
began with military modernization in 1979. Since then, the military capabilities of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) continue expanding. Specifically in the past decade, China has invested 
heavily in modern military hardware and technology. Beginning in 1989, China’s military 
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expenditures have averaged a growth rate of 12.1 percent per year.200 In 2012, China’s defense 
spending was the second largest in the world at $106 billion, although the United States’ budget 
was much larger at $671 billion.201  This is only a minor detail when considering the military 
capabilities of status quo actors dwarfed by China’s military might. China far outpaces all states 
acting around the perimeter of the SCS in defense spending: Japan, 51 billion; India, 35 billion; 
South Korea 24 billion; Vietnam, 2.4 billion—not to mention the other ASEAN states that have 
just begun militarizing in response to China’s overwhelming advantage. Furthermore, there is a 
consensus stating China deflates its reports on defense spending and hides additional funds for 
military expenditures in other areas of its budget.202 These observations become even more 
alarming when accounting for the fact that US dollars buy more in China than they do in 
America. A calculation using purchasing power parity (PPP) illustrates that the reported $106 
billion spent in China looks more like $400 billion.203 This is an alarming amount of spending to 
status quo actors suspicious of what China intends to use its military and naval forces for. 
How does China’s interest in having a large military to justify its assertive actions relate 
to the SCS? China may use its military capabilities to defend claims. An interest in large military 
forces implies that China may act aggressively and use force to defend its strategic interests.204 
This would disrupt peace and stability in the Asian region. A perceived uncertainty of China’s 
military intentions creates hysteria over how it plans to use its military power in the long run. Is 
it a benign or threatening process? Is it limited or expansive? According to the Pentagon, the 
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PRC has not made its goals clear and lacks adequate military transparency and a well-defined 
explanation to the international community of militarization’s strategic purpose.205  
 The United States asserts that a lack of clarity in China’s foreign policy goals represents 
a challenge to the global liberal order. An offensive-minded and expansive Chinese military 
doctrine, which seeks to establish a Sino-centric world order, is inherently at odds with American 
hegemony and the global liberal order it constructed. The US Department of Defense best 
articulates alarm over the nature of China’s militarization conforming to Mearsheimer’s 
understanding of global politics.206 The United States claims that the Chinese government has 
not explained “why they are moving so quickly”, “why they need such strong forces”, and “how 
they plan to use these forces”.207 Not only is uncertainty a problem for status quo liberal order 
actors in China’s periphery, but also a crucial concern for the United States. Negative trends in 
the South China Sea debate since 2008 lead authors to ascribe China’s territorial expansion and 
restrictions on multilateralism as evidence of a maritime threat.208 China’s naval forces may be 
developing with the sole aim of threatening U.S. security and interests. Mearsheimer argues that 
in its bid for regional hegemony, China will have no other way to secure its interests unless it 
displaces US global leadership.209 Admiral Robert F. Willard thinks China’s military 
development appears designed to challenge America’s freedom of action in the Asian region or 
coerce its neighbors, including U.S. treaty and alliance partners.210 China’s increasing 
capabilities could lead it to confront the American hegemon.  
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Chinese naval modernization shows signs of challenging the United States’ posture in 
Asia. Since the 1990s, China continues to pursue a strategy known as “anti-access/area-denial” 
(a2 /ad). As a result, China has significantly improved its air and sea capabilities. The Chinese 
arsenal includes anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, 
surface-to-air missiles, submarines, destroyers, patrol crafts, and amphibious ships.211 With this 
equipment, China can target every air base and port in the Western Pacific, and acquire the 
ability to sink foreign vessels, from ASEAN ships to U.S. aircraft carriers operating hundreds of 
miles off its coasts. The People’s Liberation Army has also been experimenting with cyber 
warfare, antisatellite weapons and began expanding its small force of intercontinental nuclear 
missiles. Another one of China’s current projects is developing EMP technology that can disable 
enemy military systems and hardware operating in the region.212 When interpreting this 
evidence, it seems China is building its own high tech network to “leapfrog” current American 
capabilities, as the PRC moves to cement regional hegemony.213  
The extent of China’s militarization is paired with evidence that the country is 
consistently undermining liberal order norms.  The first category creates a picture of a world 
heading towards conflict and revision. Authors that subscribe to this perspective view China’s 
defiant attitude towards international arbitration, aimed at peacefully resolving the dispute, as a 
sign that China has an interest in altering the current structure of the global liberal order. China 
will do so in a confrontational manner using military power to push its assertions and plans on 
overthrowing the status quo and usurping American hegemonic dominance. 
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Understanding China’s Military Modernization 
Authors who emphasize negative trends in relations between China and the international 
community are countered by contrasting news reports and opinions within the scholarly 
literature. In an article for Foreign Policy, Andy Hu instructs his readers to forget all the “gloom 
and doom”. Hu notes positive developments in 2014 between China and the international 
community: “China participated for the first time in this year’s U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific 
Drills, the largest international maritime exercise”.214 China’s cooperation with the international 
community suggests that military modernization could contribute to status quo peace and 
stability.  Another shortcoming of the fist school of thought is that it overlooks the importance of 
economic relationships between the countries involved in the dispute. despite suspected souring 
relations between China and its neighbors over disputes in the South China Sea (and East China 
Sea), all 21 APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) members endorsed the Free Trade Area 
of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) arrangement over the United States Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) proposal, which excluded China.215 Long-term economic cooperation between actors 
provide a foundation towards peaceful resolution of the conflict. Taken together, these two 
points suggest that China’s relationship with the international community is progressing 
positively despite citations of concern noted above. Relations with both regional neighbors and 
the United States seem to be proceeding in a relatively stable fashion. The chapter will now turn 
towards providing relevant counterpoints to arguments concerned with the nature of China’s 
militarization and China’s unilateralism in the South China Sea and in the international 
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community. The scholarly literature that deemphasizes fears in the South China Sea points to 
disputes having a minimal effect on regional cooperation and even argues that peace and stability 
have increased.216  
The first category states that China’s military policy is ambiguous and essentially 
contributes to why peace in the South China Sea is deteriorating. However, the aforementioned 
school of thought fails to acknowledge positive trends in Chinese policy. In his analysis of 
Chinese military strategy, Taylor Fravel notes that sources on China’s military doctrine and 
strategies used to train PLA officers over the past decade have become more available.217 
Analyzing the historic trend of China’s militarization, its purpose, and positive aspects of PLA 
behavior in the present day reveal how China’s military modernization shows that its objectives 
for the use of military power are more certain than many policy analysts maintain.218  
 Since beginning its military reforms, China has been influenced by global trends it 
perceived within the international community, as the PRC became a more active global 
participant in the post-Mao era. Under Mao’s autarkic system, China’s military had limited 
capacity beyond its borders. Yet, after a confrontation with Vietnam in 1979, China became 
aware that its military and naval forces needed to be significantly upgraded. This event led China 
to begin expanding its military budget beyond ground capabilities. As a result, China has 
developed the capabilities to conduct military and naval operations crucial to backing its security 
objectives: regime security, territorial integrity, national unification, maritime security, and 
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regional stability.219 China’s militarization has strategic, limited purposes that the school of 
thought prone to push “all-out war” scenarios seems to overlook. 
China’s increased emphasis on modernizing its military in the 1990’s can be explained by 
its perception of American military power. In 1991, the U.S deployed military troops in the 
Persian Gulf War that far outmatched China’s capabilities, emphasizing the global role of the 
U.S military.220 China’s reaction to American superiority is reflected in its updated military 
strategy in 1993, when the Chinese leaders revised the PLA’s military strategy to be capable of 
fighting “local wars under modern high technology conditions”221. The Taiwan Strait Crisis in 
1995-1996 further emphasized this point when the United States sent aircrafts to support Taiwan 
after China set off missiles in the Strait. The United States threatened intervention exacerbated 
Chinese insecurity over the fact that the U.S could deploy advanced military technology in 
support of Taiwan. China has labeled Taiwan a core interest that it is not afraid to use military 
force over. However, the PRC’s position is meaningless if the United States can overpower 
China if the U.S. chooses to intervene. Part of the reason China is increasing its military power is 
to act as a deterrent of American interference in issues seen as integral to Chinese sovereignty.222 
In regards to seeking global leadership or seeking to usurp the United States’ role as 
global hegemon, Chinese officials have made statements that stand at odds with Western 
arguments about its militarization meaning it seeks global leadership. In a 2010 interview for the 
Wall Street Journal, State Councilor Dai Bingguo told the U.S. audience that ‘‘China has never 
thought of vying for leading position in the world,’’ that China has cooperated with the United 
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States over various trouble spots, and is a ‘‘partner the United States can count on”.223 He stated 
that China was not seeking ‘‘hegemony,’’ that it did not want to ‘‘eject the U.S. from Asia,’’ and 
that the South China Sea would be resolved by future generations.224 Unlike the United States, 
China does not display the same caliber or power-projection capabilities of a global military. 
China still has a long way to go in developing the capacities of a modern military. PLA buildup 
doesn’t imply a rejection of cooperation with United States, but only a desire to level the playing 
field. Two of China’s core purposes for military power are maritime security and regional 
stability. Increased naval patrols and activity in the South China Sea display China taking a 
proactive role in maintain its security objectives in the region.225  
Part of China’s reason for modernizing stems from a disadvantage in protecting Chinese 
sovereignty in worst-case scenarios. The U.S. maintains ties with China’s neighbors and regional 
competitors, many whom have competing territorial claims with China. The primary issue is 
Taiwan, whom the U.S. agreed to sell arms to in 2010, despite Beijing’s core interest in national 
unification and sensitivity on the issue. In addition, the United States retains a dominant regional 
presence. Washington has enhanced both its military and naval postures in East Asia in the 21st 
century. 60 percent of U.S submarines are deployed in Asia.226 In 2006, the U.S government 
signaled its intention to keep more U.S naval forces in the Pacific than the Atlantic.227 The 
United States has moved attack submarines, B-2 bombers, surveillance drones, and ammunition 
stockpiles to an American military outpost in Guam. It also upgraded relations with South Korea, 
one of China’s immediate neighbors. During the Bush Administration, the U.S withdrew 40% of 
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its troops from South Korea and reduced military exercises between the two countries.  This 
trend has been reversed in light of the Obama administration’s Pivot to East Asia announced in 
2010, which aims to amplify U.S defense ties with countries throughout the region and increase 
U.S. naval presence.228 The U.S and South Korea reached new defense agreements and upgraded 
American military facilities on the Korean Peninsula. The United States has moved more troops 
to South Korea and the two countries conduct joint naval exercises with increasing frequency.  
In the post-2008 setting, the United States has also increased cooperation with many 
other actors in China’s “backyard”. The U.S. expanded its joint naval exercises with Japan, 
conducted naval exercises with Vietnam for the first time since the Vietnam War, and signed an 
agreement on defense cooperation with Vietnam in 2011. The United States sells arms to the 
Philippines and in 2014 made plans to further finance its military modernization.229 In addition, 
the United States strengthened ties with Cambodia, and restored defense cooperation with 
Indonesia and New Zealand, while stationing marines in Australia. Even with budget cuts in 
2011 and 2012, the U.S. government has emphasized its strength in Asia.230  
As China’s rise prompts its growing activity, the Chinese strategy is framed by a strong 
U.S presence in the region. Meanwhile, the United States and its developed allies maintain an 
arms and defense technology embargo that has been in place since 1989. In justifying its 
defensive military buildup, the Chinese perspective asserts that Washington’s activity in Asia is 
aimed at containing China’s rise. It seems the threat China poses to the U.S is an indirect and 
limited one based on being able to defend China’s regional security objectives despite the 
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dominant capabilities of the United States. The extension of Chinese military operations into the 
South China Sea is a result of its developing maritime capacities and indicates a defensive 
strategy.  
Framing the Debate That Surrounds the South China Sea 
China’s noncompliance with freedom of navigation norms and its expansion in the South 
China Sea raises concern about whether China seeks to unilaterally enforce its “territorial sea” 
and claim all resources in the region. Yet, in 2012 the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that “no 
country, including China, has claimed sovereignty over the entire South China Sea”.231 Why 
then, would China’s actions in the South China Sea look to be acting assertively and confronting 
foreign vessels? Part of the reason is that often times the media reports on the issue selectively. 
China is not the only state to conduct surveillance and arrests: ASEAN members also get 
involved in the conflict. Indonesian patrol boats seized two Vietnamese vessels in February 
2012. Furthermore, Chinese vessels have also been harassed in the South China Sea. In 2009 
Indonesia claimed it caught more than 180 foreign vessels for illegal fishing in their waters. This 
includes 75 Chinese fishermen arrested by Indonesia in June.232 China’s increased maritime 
surveillance in the South China Sea is also aimed at protecting its vessels from foreign 
harassment.  
China has been expanding its activities in the South China Sea since it first occupied the 
Paracel islands in 1976 when it clashed with Vietnam. However, China is not the only actor that 
occupies features in the South China Sea despite the unsettled nature of the dispute.233 For 
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example, Vietnam maintains armed garrisons and military troops on about 22 geographic 
locations throughout the South China Sea and has also undertaken significant construction 
activity, building airstrips on a variety of features to assert its claims.234 In addition, all claimants 
occupy some part of the Spratly Islands. Unlike China, some claimants already have airfield 
capabilities on the Spratly islands: Vietnam on Southwest Cay; Taiwan on Taiping island; the 
Philippines on Pagasa island; and Malaysia on Swallow Reef.235 Given this information, China’s 
infrastructural expansion, including its Scarborough Shoal activities, in the South China Sea 
looks like a natural response to its strategic environment and the actions of other claimants in the 
South China Sea.  
One shortcoming of authors who fear China’s militarization being aimed at unilaterally 
securing its energy needs in the SCS is that they fail to acknowledge energy security is not a 
zero-sum game. China may be pursuing energy claims in the South China Sea, but this does not 
mean other countries cannot do so too. Hong and Jiang note that multiple countries are involved 
in joint ventures with oil companies and also maintain energy expeditions in the SCS. Malaysia 
has gas fields off the coast of Sarawak; the Philippines operate within the Camago and 
Malampaya fields; Indonesia has the Natuna gas field and a pipeline to Singapore; along with 
Vietnamese Lan Tay and Lan Do gas fields that are being operated by BP in a joint venture with 
an Indian oil company and PetroVietnam.236 And, despite its protest of other countries pursuing 
natural resource exploration with Western oil companies, China has even shown a willingness to 
address energy security in a multilateral context. Oil corporations from China, the Philippines, 
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and Vietnam signed a joint agreement on marine seismic research in the SCS in 2005.237 
Although the agreement was reported to have lapsed in 2008, its proposal points to the potential 
for joint development between the regional actors to effectively manage the security objectives 
crucial to their long-term interests in the SCS. Much of the fear from the first school of thought 
interprets China’s energy-related activities in the South China Sea as a sign that it seeks to assert 
its unilateral control. Instead, the second school of thought states that China’s activities are a 
result of both its capabilities on the international stage and its need to develop energy security 
increasing simultaneously. Even though the Western media mostly focus on China’s 
development in the SCS, several regional actors steadily maintain energy projects in the area 
despite the ongoing nature of the dispute. 
Multilateralism Downplays Conflict in the South China Sea 
The second side of the debate deemphasizes citations of China’s questionable behavior in 
the South China Sea, operating from a stance that sees the Chinese grand strategy still 
conforming to Deng’s policy advice of avoiding conflict and pursuing joint development.238 
Michael Weissmann argues that relative peace and stability in the region has actually 
increased.239 This perspective concludes that fears over conflict in the South China Sea 
stemming from China’s actions are overstated and need proper contextualization.240 While some 
of China’s actions may contribute to friction, the importance is that conflicts are being actively 
managed and have not erupted into military conflict. As a result of the positive trend in China’s 
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activeness and its use of diplomacy rather than military coercion, conflict in the South China Sea 
appears capable of being managed through cooperation.241 
In 2010, Marvin Ott made three points about the geopolitics of the South China Sea. 
First, China’s claims and those of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei have been 
downplayed as the countries all have put an overwhelming preference on economic growth. 
Second, China’s treatment of Vietnam is the exception to the first point. Third, some of China’s 
actions, like the harassment of the U.S Impeccable, are “disturbing”.242 Utilizing Ott’s 
observation of developments in the South China, the chapter will assess China’s behavior on the 
international stage from a second school of thought. 
Economic Interdependence and Regional Diplomacy 
Ott’s first point is that despite the reports of worsening relations in the South China Sea, 
economic rationale still forms the foundation for thinking about conflict destabilizing relations 
between claimants. Several authors note aspects of China’s relationship with other claimants that 
support Ott’s first point.  Since the turn of the century, China’s has adapted a proactive outlook 
on participating in multilateral forums with countries involved in the South China Sea. This has 
served as a foundation for preventing conflict over dispute in the SCS.243 Through an active 
approach to regional cooperation beginning in the 1990’s, China has alleviated the fears of its 
neighbors, allowing economic ties to grow as a buffer to conflict. Today, China is ASEAN’s 
largest trading partner. The SCS conflict cannot be separated from the overarching Sino-ASEAN 
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relations. The second way of looking at the international political system emphasizes the historic 
progression of crisis management and diplomatic cooperation between actors in the South China 
Sea. In a relatively short period, China moved from passivity and suspicion to proactive 
engagement in regional regimes and institutions.244  Through this lens, economic 
interdependence and the embrace of multilateral cooperation between ASEAN states and China 
over the dispute have deescalated the chances of conflict in the South China Sea.  There is a 
framework towards settling the dispute in the long run and preserving the status quo. 
Elite interactions and Sino-ASEAN/East Asian regionalization developed out of the web 
of diplomatic venues that have helped to mitigate tensions in the South China Sea. The 
“Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea” workshops, hosted by Indonesia in the 
early 1990’s, served as a platform for China to assess its relationship in diplomatic venues with 
other claimants in the South China Sea. China’s experience with the workshops led the country 
to dramatically reexamine its view of multilateral institutions and served as a stepping stone 
towards negotiation between the claimants by promoting cooperation, confidence building, and 
trust among conflicting parties.245 As Song and Tønneson state in an article that evaluates the 
severity of conflict in the SCS, “the balance has shifted over time toward a stronger regional 
emphasis on conflict management manifested in the 2002 China-ASEAN Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties, which rejected the use of force to resolve disputes in the South China Sea.246 
China has also begun to emphasize coordinating regional security efforts. In the 2003 ARF Inter-
Sessional Group and ARF foreign ministers’ meetings, China startled other members by 
introducing a concept paper that included a wide-ranging set of proposals for increasing regional 
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military exchanges and establishing an annual security policy conference.247 At the same 
summit, ASEAN and China signed the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity, which addresses a wide range of political, social, economic, and security issues. And, 
in 2003, China formally acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which formally 
commits China to enforcing the principles of nonaggression and noninterference. Although the 
treaty dedicates countries to upholding these two principles, many of the signatories, not just 
China, are guilty of interfering in the affairs of other actors in the SCS. However, when incidents 
occur, they appear to be minor and have been managed by the governments of the states 
involved. Furthermore, tensions in the South China Sea have not become overtly aggressive or 
disrupted status quo stability. While conflict persists in the post-2008 era, it is being managed 
through economic interdependence and diplomatic venues to promote the maintenance of normal 
relations. 
Defusing Tension in the Sino-Vietnamese Relationship 
Ott also points out that Sino-Vietnamese relations in the South China Sea remain 
antagonistic, but another crucial aspect of the South China Sea debate is the historic de-
escalation of conflict between all actors: including China and Vietnam. Recall China’s cable 
cutting conflict with Vietnam over gas and oil exploration. The pessimistic school of thought 
would interpret this as evidence that China is provoking conflict, even though China has 
protested.  Yet, Chinese and Vietnamese officials in October 2011 signed a six-point agreement 
in response to the cable cutting, taking a step towards solving their maritime disputes “on the 
basis of legislation and principles enshrined in international law, including the United Nations 
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Convention on the Law of the Sea signed in 1982”.248 And, even though China insists that it 
stands firm on its maritime claims, the PRC withdrew the oil rig it had placed near the 
Vietnamese coast when its development in contested waters was ill-received.249 Historically 
speaking, tensions in the South China Sea have decreased, and war has become less likely as a 
result of China’s acceptance of multilateralism and the institutionalization of regional 
relationships has led to conflict management.250 This is a significant achievement given the fact 
that violent conflict has been quick to erupt in the past.  In 1974, China and Vietnam clashed in 
military conflict over the Paracel Islands that left over 50 dead when Vietnamese artillery ships 
fired at Chinese fishing boats and caused retaliation by the PRC.251 The two countries clashed 
again in 1988 over the Spratly Islands in an incident that left over 70 Vietnamese dead.252 
Although persisting present day frictions show how historical tensions over the South 
China Sea run deep in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, the two countries have put an increased 
emphasis on working together to create a basis for conflict prevention since normalizing 
diplomatic relations in 1991. Elite interactions between China and Vietnam have increased. Party 
leaders meet once a year to coordinate bilateral exchanges, and military officials also exchange 
visits. Vietnam’s economic ties with China have also dramatically increased, deemphasizing the 
likelihood of conflict since bilateral relations began to develop. China has heavily invested in a 
number of joint ventures with Vietnam, and a recent report from the Vietnam News states that 
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China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner.253 Furthermore, Vietnam is a member of the China-
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement that went into effect in 2010 and also part of APEC, which 
extended the regional FTA in 2014. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area is a primary example of 
how the SCS dispute is one of the many aspects of foreign policy that the countries involved 
need to consider when approaching overarching relations in the region. 
Sino-U.S. Cooperation and China’s Military Diplomacy 
While Ott states that five Chinese vessels’ interference with naval surveillance routines 
by the USNS Impeccable is “disturbing”, Strategic and Defense Studies specialist Brendan 
Taylor reports that good sense prevailed between China and the United States. Senior officials 
from both countries stated that “such incidents would not become the norm and pledged deeper 
cooperation to ensure so”.254 Successful resolution suggests that there has been cooperation over 
incidents in recent years that could potentially reduce conflict. The resolution of the Impeccable 
incident stands at odds with Denny Roy’s claim that U.S-China military relations are in poor 
condition.255 In addition, conflict management undermines the first school of thought’s argument 
that believes China and the United States are heading towards future conflict. Through the 
perspective of the second school of thought, China’s non-confrontational military modernization 
finds evidence in instances of successful cooperation over minor incidents, Considering how 
China held U.S air personnel captive for a week in 2001 when extracting an apology from the 
U.S government over a collision that left a Chinese pilot dead, relations seem to be progressing 
in a positive direction that will help maintain peace and stability.  
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In addition to noting how China’s activities in the South China Sea are being managed, 
the second perspective also cites how Chinese military and naval forces are contributing to 
regional and international security, rather than threatening stability. Despite the modernization 
needs of the Chinese military to defend both its traditional and nontraditional interests, defense 
spending has also been allocated towards supporting multilateral security. In recent years, China 
emphasizes the importance of its military diplomacy, increasing bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation with other countries. China conducts a wide range of military exchanges with over 
150 nations, ranging from high level dialogues and personnel training to coordinating on 
nontraditional global security issues like disaster relief. After refusing to participate in joint 
exercises with foreign militaries and navies for many years, China began to participate in the 
Gulf of Aden counter piracy operations in 2008. Another aspect of China’s military 
modernization contributing to global security is its participation in United Nations’ Peacekeeping 
Operations. Of all the permanent members on the U.N. Security Council, including the United 
States, China is the largest contributor towards global peacekeeping efforts.256 The integration of 
Chinese military forces into the structure of the international political system serves as a way of 
binding China to the international political system. This perspective shows China’s military 
actively participating in security objectives beyond its sovereign territory and regional seas 
enhancing, not detracting from, peace and stability. Conflict between China and the United 
States or other members of the international community seems far off when focusing on a 
broader picture of China’s military strategy. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
The spoiler, supporter, and shirker scenarios identify key possibilities concerning the 
nature of China’s relationship with the international system. Changing power capabilities, the 
institutional structure of the international political system, and a state’s national interest frame 
the debate on China’s present day behavior. As David Shambaugh suggests,  
China’s growing economic and military power, expanding political influence, distinctive 
diplomatic voice, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral institutions are key 
developments in Asian affairs. China’s new proactive regional posture is reflected in 
virtually all policy spheres— economic, diplomatic, and military—and this parallels 
China’s increased activism on the global stage.257  
The arguments that the three scenarios offer are important to consider when assessing China’s 
future impact on the world, but it is crucial to outline the assumptions and shortcomings of each 
scenario before analyzing China’s behavior in the World Trade Organization and South China 
Sea. The spoiler scenario is built upon a foundation that focuses on states’ divergent interests and 
security challenges in the global system. Yet, it does not acknowledge the institutionalization of 
economic relations between states in the historic evolution of the international political system. 
The supporter scenario is built upon the foundation of a highly interconnected global order and 
bases its claims of Chinese conformity on China’s economic integration. However, it glazes over 
the frictions between China and the international community, and assumes China will inevitably 
become the Western model of a responsible stakeholder. The shirker scenario focuses on China’s 
economic integration and the ways Chinese policy is guided by domestic interests. This scenario 
cites evidence to explain China’s reluctance to play an active part in the global governance 
structure. However, it does not do a sufficient job engaging China’s proactivity on the 
international stage. 
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After conducting case studies on China’s activity in the World Trade Organization and in 
the South China Sea, I conclude that China is willing to accept international norms compatible 
with its interests, but it also seeks to use its capabilities as a rising power to modify international 
norms so that they take into account Chinese interests. The rise of China will manifest itself in a 
way that is most consistent with the supporter scenario. China favors a strategy of integration 
into the existing international political system while revising aspects of the global liberal order 
that do not adequately reflect the divergent nature of its goals from Western interests. Even when 
aspects of China’s behavior point towards revisionism, its foreign policy approach is still 
working within the framework of multilateralism. That being said, China’s overall multilateral 
diplomacy cannot be categorized as fundamentally status quo or revisionist in nature. This 
framework does not take into account the character of Chinese assertiveness. It is important to 
note that China’s growing assertiveness on the international stage is contained by the multilateral 
structure of the international political system. In an article on China’s diverse multilateralism, 
Wuthnow, Qi, and Li outline four basic behaviors that can be applied to its economic and 
security strategy on the international stage. They describe how China’s activity materializes 
through “watching, which is a passive, status quo-oriented posture; engaging, which is an 
assertive, but still status quo-oriented posture; circumventing, which is revisionist, but relatively 
unassertive; and shaping, which is both revisionist and assertive in nature”.258 In the World 
Trade Organization, China has moved beyond watching and in recent years taken a more active 
approach towards utilizing the WTO DSB. China is engaging in some ways and shaping in 
others. It has even circumvented Western institutions in the international economic system and 
played a lead role in developing multilateral infrastructure, much like the United States did in the 
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post-World War II era. In the South China Sea, China’s strategy reveals elements of engaging, 
circumventing, and shaping. Even when seeking to revise norms of the global liberal order, 
China has done this in a relatively non-confrontational way. China’s behavior will remain status 
quo oriented to maintain the economic benefits of its relationships, adapting to norms while 
taking a more assertive stance on issues central to its domestic policy. China’s behavior in the 
WTO and SCS both suggest status quo oriented behavior. Concerning the WTO, China is 
working within the multilateral structure of the international trading system to advance its own 
strategy while accepting norms it sees as compatible with its interests. China’s economic model 
distinctly maintains the role of the state in economic policy while accepting the dominant 
principles of Western capitalism. While China defends the Beijing Consensus despite pressure 
from the United States, it has actively implemented WTO DSB resolutions and shown an active 
approach in developing its domestic institutions and international standards to address issues 
such as intellectual property theft. In other ways, China’s integration into the status quo reflects 
the reality of the international political system. Like other WTO members, China has been found 
guilty of enacting protectionist policies that contradict the obligations of membership in the 
organization. In the South China Sea, China has pursued energy development and increased its 
activities in the region despite the unresolved nature of the dispute.  
The case studies on China’s actions in the World Trade Organization and South China 
Sea reveal that China’s integration into the multilateral structure of the international political 
system has come a long way since Mao’s autarkic era. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms have 
influenced China to play a more active role in the international community, and doing so has led 
the country to adapt to international economic and security norms as it will continue to do in the 
future. However, China’s sovereignty is still at the core of its foreign policy approach. While 
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China’s rise is contained by the institutionalized structured of the global liberal order, its 
growing influence as a great power allows it to defend its national interest on the international 
stage when pressured by aspects of the Western-oriented global liberal order. China is a status 
quo actor in regards to maintaining peace and stability within the international political system, 
but it will influence the global liberal order to evolve into a system that reflects the divergent 
national interests of its participants. This will not be a confrontational process but will take place 
within the multilateral and diplomatic structure of the international political system. In the era of 
China’s rise, there is an emphasis on norms of conflict management and maintaining 
international stability crucial to the domestic interest of all actors involved. While the United 
States and its allies constructed the global liberal order, China’s evolution allows the country to 
play a major role in challenging aspects of the international political system that privilege 
Western practices. Integrative aspects of China’s foreign policy within the status quo suggest that 
the outcome offered by the spoiler scenario is unlikely to manifest itself. Furthermore, China’s 
conformity to the emphasis on conflict resolution and its willingness to participate in the 
multilateral framework of the international political system indicates that the country’s rise will 
be most consistent with the supporter scenario. Still, China will defend its national interests 
through acceptable standards and “shirk” aspects of the global liberal order that are geared 
towards Western or American interests. By offering research that considers China’s increased 
participation in the system along with the challenges that exist in its relationship with the global 
liberal order, I take a stance similar to Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur in their argument of 
China’s future role in the system. This scenario is characterized by a “third way of continued 
internalization by China of select global practices and norms, alongside registering its desire and 
right to be at the table for rewriting some”.259 Globalization, economic interdependence, and the 
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explicit intention of countries to avoid conflict have changed the nature of great power 
relationships.260 Conflict management, enduring stability, and the development of a multipolar 
world characterize the future elements of the international political system. 
Analysis of China and the World Trade Organization 
In the words of China’s 2008 national defense white paper, “the future and destiny of 
China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community. China cannot 
develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability 
without China”.261 Chinese officials understand that China is dealing with an institutionalized 
order that cannot be ignored. Its integration into the global economy has created a degree of 
dependency on the international community. Economic thinking by both China and the United 
States forms the underlying reason why each country has a core interest in maintaining favorable 
conditions in the international environment.  Ikenberry states that “Chinese economic interests 
would seem to be most congruent with the existing international order. The global capitalist 
system is open and loosely institutionalized—and it is a system in which China is currently 
thriving”.262 Unlike the Soviet Union, China’s economy is heavily intertwined with the actors of 
the global liberal order.  In addition, WTO rules bar the American government from enacting 
trade sanctions against China to settle economic (and sometimes noneconomic) disputes on its 
own terms.263 In the future, membership in the WTO will be pivotal to China’s economic 
relationship with the international community. WTO rules and institutions offer legal and 
political protection against future economic discrimination, as the Chinese economy grows and 
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develops its capabilities to advance its claims in the WTO.264 Even if the WTO dispute 
settlement body allows the U.S. and the EU to criticize the Beijing Consensus, when China 
receives full market economy status from the WTO in 2016. the Beijing Consensus will be 
validated as legitimate economic strategy, despite its divergence from Western norms.  
China’s strategy may cause friction between actors in the global economy, but on the 
whole it seems to be in line with supporting the structure of a globalized economic system. When 
challenging norms on economic strategy within the global liberal order, China has done so 
within the established framework of the international political system so as to not disrupt status 
quo stability. With regard to its growing presence in multilateral negotiation mechanisms, China 
embodies the divergent interests of many countries from those traditional great powers within the 
system. China – unlike the United States or members of the EU – is a developing country, a non-
Western culture, a non-democracy, a victim of colonialism, and a country opposed to 
intervention in other states’ internal affairs.265 It is worth noting that when China pushed for 
WTO recognition of its market economy status, the country gained accelerated support from 
friendly states such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela.266 Given the distinctive 
character of the Beijing Consensus, China’s membership in the World Trade Organization 
provides an outlet for multilateral negotiation in regards to economic policies acceptable in the 
global trading system beyond the criteria of the Washington Consensus. China’s economic 
policy of market socialism has provided an attractive model for other developing countries that 
fear accepting outright capitalism will expose their populace to the pressure of market forces.267 
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The disputes between China and the international community are historically persistent 
issues resulting from the growth of the overall beneficial economic relationships China has 
established with its trading partners. Now, these disputes are being funneled into an institution 
dedicated to resolving trade tensions in the global economic system. China appears to be actively 
implementing DSB rulings while advancing its own complaints utilizing the DSB against the 
discriminatory policies it often faces. Since China’s reform era began, it has made a variety of 
concessions to U.S. interests so it could gain the benefits of participating in the global economy, 
but there is still a continuation of trade frictions targeting China’s willingness to liberalize. 
Bringing disputes to the WTO illustrates a mechanism for the U.S. to engage China on issues it 
sees as crucial to its interests, like forcing the Chinese economy to liberalize as much as possible 
before 2016.  For example, while China has made drastic reforms in its system, it has not 
completely accepted the terms of its Accession Protocol. The European Union Press Release 
Database notes that “China committed itself to refrain from imposing export duties except for 84 
specific tariff lines…it still applies export duties on 346 tariff lines, as well as export quota and 
licensing regimes on many products”.268 Rulings in the raw materials and rare earth disputes 
draw attention to obligations China has not fully signed on to and sets a precedent for future 
cases brought against China concerning trade barriers. Regardless of its status in the WTO, 
China is largely still a developing country that may not be able to live up to the standard in 
international trade.269 While China continues to build its domestic capabilities to meet the 
standards of its WTO Accession, the Western Financial Crisis has created an international 
environment where the United States and its trading partners will be especially critical of state 
intervention that affects their industries. China’s hybrid economy plays a critical role in the 
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disputes and could pose a challenge to WTO jurisprudence in the long run when delivering 
rulings.270 As a result of the complexity of the issue, increased litigation may threaten to 
overload the WTO with cases and in turn undermine its ability to issue rulings that China must 
abide by, but this remains to be seen. China has played a proactive role in settling many of the 
disputes without waiting for the DSB to. Of the 31 disputes that have been filed against China, 
23 have been settled. In 11 of the 23 disputes, China handled complaints bilaterally before the 
DSB needed to investigate the issue, making the changes necessary to satisfy its trading 
partners.271 China’s pattern of bilaterally handling disputes in some instances while 
implementing DSB findings in others shows that the Chinese government is receptive to the 
complaints filed against it. In the future, it is likely that China will continue to adapt to 
international standards when frictions arise in its economic relationships. 
Even though the state has historically played a pivotal role in the Chinese economy, and 
the economies of Japan and South Korea also retain distinctive characteristics when compared to 
Western economies, the United States consistently challenges the structure of the China’s 
economy while turning a blind eye to other Asian countries.272 Despite the divergent strategies of 
other Asian economies and historical diminution of the role of the Chinese state in its economy 
as it has integrated into global capitalist trading structures, the United States remains highly 
critical of China’s strategy. There are three reasons why this problem persists. First, the United 
States took the lead in establishing liberal institutions and creating the order China is integrating 
within. As a result, the U.S will criticize practices it believes are inconsistent with the global 
norms that it has established. Second, the United States has run a trade deficit increasing year by 
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year since 1971, while China’s manufacturing and export industry have steadily grown. Third, 
the United States’ trade imbalance with China became the U.S.’s largest bilateral trade deficit in 
2000. Concentrating its trading deficit on China created a fat political target for American 
domestic constituencies to vent their frustrations on.273  
The divergent nature of the Beijing Consensus and the fact that China is found guilty in 
many of the disputes filed against it could raise the possibility of a challenge to the liberal norm 
of markets free from state intervention, but in the post-2008 era even the American government 
has taken a more active role in the economy. As Chapter 2 reveals, the United States 
administration also manipulates global market access when imposing green barriers on Chinese 
products and enacting discriminatory safeguards to support its domestic interests.274 Unlike 
China, the legal framework established by China’s Accession Protocol and WTO agreements 
condone discriminatory methods that the United States utilizes. As protectionist policies show, 
democratic-capitalistic societies like the United States also emphasize the role of the state in both 
foreign and domestic affairs. The renewal of the Patriot Act by the Obama Administration in 
2011, continued military operations in the Middle East under the pretext of the war on terror 
since unilaterally intervening in the region in 2003, and reports of increased surveillance by the 
National Security Agency are a few illustrations of the American government dealing with its 
strategic interests in the era of globalization in a similar way to the Chinese government. 
However, the best example of Washington emphasizing the role of the state is demonstrated by 
the government-sponsored bailout of banks and crucial sectors to the American economy in the 
wake of the Western Financial Crisis.  
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Since the World Trade Organization is a Western liberal institution created by the United 
States, there is a potential for the WTO to act biased and rule in favor of established Western 
preferences while slighting Chinese interests. If the WTO appears one sided, then China may 
become disillusioned and choose to discontinue its participation based on grievances with the 
organization’s legitimacy.  This does not seem likely. China is heavily invested in mastering the 
legal formalities of the WTO. The country has a desire to advance its disputes with 
foundationally solid legal claims as a way of solving its grievances with other actors in the 
international trading system.  For example, in 2012 and 2014 China challenged the legality of the 
“double remedy” approach that the United States has taken in recent years of charging China 
with both anti-dumping restrictions and countervailing duties in the same claim to increase the 
likelihood the WTO DSB finds China guilty.275 China filed a claim against the “double remedy” 
approach in 2008, but most of its complaints were rejected on the basis of its non-market 
economy status.276 However, the DSB ruled in favor of China’s complaint filed in 2012 and 
reversed the decision in the 2008 case after reviewing the legality of the United States’ 
practices.277 Advancing repetitive claims through the WTO suggests China is developing the 
techniques to effectively handle the problems it faces in its trading relationship. More 
importantly, the rulings suggest that the WTO will handle disputes in an unbiased manner 
despite its organizational roots as a Western institution. In a recent complaint, China questioned 
the methodology the U.S. employs when conducting anti-dumping investigations involving 
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Chinese products.278 As a result of these developments, it is unlikely that certain tactics the U.S. 
uses to exploit China’s NME status will persist in the future, especially once the WTO grants 
China FME status. Likewise, it should be expected that China will utilize the DSB to force other 
WTO members like the United States to remove other discriminatory barriers that will be out of 
date once China receives FME designation. China’s strategy reflects that the country is 
supporting the multilateral structure of the international system by utilizing the WTO to 
proactively resolve the challenges in its trading relationship with other WTO members, 
specifically the United States.  
Analysis of China and the South China Sea 
In the South China Sea, military tensions have had little effect on the overall diplomatic 
relations of the countries involved. This is the case even in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, 
which allegedly is the most antagonistic relationship among claimants involved in the SCS 
dispute. Referencing the oil dispute with Vietnam in 2014, Yi Xianliang, deputy director-general 
of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, ruled out the chances 
of military conflict boiling over in the SCS, stating, “we have never, are not and will never send 
military forces. Because we are carrying out normal, civilian, commercial activities”.279 Even 
though competing sovereignty claims remain unresolved, actors continue to pursue their distinct 
interest in the SCS while managing minor incidents to sustain economic relationships. The 
emphasis in the SCS is on management, not conflict. 
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  While conflicts in the South China Sea are a major foundation of speculators who foresee 
the spoiler scenario manifesting itself, China’s role as an economic powerhouse in the region 
downplays the likelihood of disputes in the SCS boiling over to disrupt international stability. 
Furthermore, China is aware that exacerbating its trading partners’ fear over its intentions in the 
SCS could disrupt its goal of economic development, having an adverse effect on domestic 
affairs. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the South China Sea will become a flashpoint in the 
future. Countries have actively managed minor incidents when they have occurred in the region 
and all express an interest in maintaining status quo peace and stability. Overall, the evidence 
offered in favor of the supporter scenario discredits fears over Chinese assertiveness in the post-
2008 era. While the first school of thought points out how China’s increasing power capabilities 
exacerbate hysteria over negative trends in the SCS, the second school of thought dilutes the 
likelihood of these events leading China to act as a spoiler. Evidence offered by the second 
school of thought points to consistency in a strategy where China adopts non-confrontational 
methods of securing its position in the South China Sea. Furthermore, China is aware of the 
realities that shape the contours of its policy in the South China Sea.  
As political scientist Ning Liao states, “Beijing’s positive approach to the regional 
engagement however does not mean its automatic socialization into the rules and norms of a 
multilateral regime”.280 Like most countries, China will prioritize its national interests over 
aspects of the global liberal order that hinder its security. China is reluctant to accept the 
legitimacy of Western oriented policies in the Asian region given the fact that international law 
does not consider the historical roots of China’s claims in the SCS debate. As a result, China has 
invoked its right to defy arbitration. The reason China refuses to participate in international 
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arbitration is that the tribunal may disregard China’s historical claims in resolving the dispute, 
and/or China is concerned that Vietnam and the Philippines will be able to leveraging the 
Chinese government into accepting a resolution that it does not play a direct role in negotiating. 
International arbitration runs the risk of undermining the validity of Chinese sovereignty, despite 
the country’s role position as the historically dominant actor in the region prior to the Opium 
Wars period. A core aspect of China’s multilateral approach is informed by this principle. It 
wants to form a multilateral structure based on respect of sovereignty rather than its disregard.281 
Referencing claims in the South China Sea, Chinese President Xi Jinping states that “we are 
strongly committed to safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and security, and defending our 
territorial integrity”.282 This quote emphasizes that China will actively defend aspects of its 
foreign policy that are integral to domestic considerations. In referencing the defense of its 
sovereignty, China is in line with principles of the global liberal order even though it will not 
participate in the international tribunal. However, the Chinese government has stated that it will 
remain receptive to bilaterally negotiating a resolution with other claimants in the region. In 
2010, the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC took place in 
both China and Vietnam. Despite the fears of China’s increasing assertiveness in the post-2008 
era spoiling the status quo, relations between the two seem stable and constructive. While China 
remains open to compromise, it cannot be doubted that its role as a relatively influential actor in 
both the regional and international community will give the country priority in any future 
negotiations. The United States and international actors should acknowledge the logical 
foundations of China’s argument and engage the country in reaching a settlement of the dispute. 
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Any major resolution will be based in China’s satisfaction with the deal on the basis that it will 
not impede its sovereignty in the region as a developing power with increasing objectives on the 
global stage.  
Even though China is opposed to international arbitration in the SCS, it still demonstrates 
status quo behavior by avoiding an outbreak of military conflict over sovereignty claims. China 
and other actors in the region prioritize joint economic development and conflict management. 
Historically, regional relationships have improved, and the normalization of diplomatic relations 
between actors has prevented the South China Sea from evolving into a flashpoint. China’s 
militarization is aimed at defending sovereignty, stability and territorial integrity. Chinese 
military diplomacy is not offensive in nature. Even if it were, the United States and its allies 
would respond to outright aggression. Neither Southeast Asian states nor the United States will 
accept a Sino-centric nautical order. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, associate professors of 
strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, state that if the rise of China manifests itself in this way, 
competing powers would push back.283 The United States would no doubt intervene in the South 
China Sea if China’s actions threatened to harm American interests. For economic and security 
purposes, despite the fact that the U.S. has no direct geopolitical stake in the region, the South 
China Sea is squarely at the center of U.S. maritime interests.284 The balance of military power 
between China and the countries of Southeast Asia is clearly shifting in China’s favor, but its 
military is still far outmatched by the United States. In the immediate future, China is far from 
possessing the necessary capabilities to control the Spratlys, and lacks the technology, military 
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and power projection capabilities to impose naval hegemony in Southeast Asia.285 A report from 
the Pentagon in 2011 on the Chinese military illustrates the point that the American military far 
exceeds the power capabilities of the Chinese military. Less than 30 percent of China’s naval 
surface forces, air forces, and air defense forces and only 55 percent of its submarine fleet could 
be considered modern. In short, China is unable to challenge U.S. dominance at sea or 
dramatically alter the balance of power maintained by the United States in the region.286 When 
China passed a law that required foreign aircraft to identify their movements in the East China 
Sea to the Chinese government, the United States flew two B-52 bombers through China’s newly 
announced “Air Defense Identification Zone” without informing Beijing in advance. Given the 
United States’ economic and strategic interest in the region, it is by no means fated that China 
can dictate its terms to weaker neighbors under prevailing circumstances. As Yoshihara states, 
the United States and its Southeast Asian allies should take care not to hype Chinese intentions 
or capabilities.287 In the future, status quo stability will persist as both regional and international 
actors dictate what is and is not acceptable behavior in the South China Sea. 
That being said, China’s growing influence in the region provides it with the capabilities 
to defend its sovereignty claims and pursue its energy needs crucial to domestic development. 
Even though the pivot to East Asia highlights the United States presence in the region, the 
hegemon seems prepared to accept China’s increasing influence in the region. Despite Hilary 
Clinton’s remarks in 2010 that suggested the U.S. would act as a mediator in the dispute based 
on international law, the US is not a signatory of UNCLOS, and its official policy takes no 
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position on competing actors’ sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.288 In 2012 when the 
Philippines challenged China’s construction on the Scarborough Shoal, the United States refused 
to side with the Philippines, despite the mutual defense treaty the two countries share.289 This 
allows China ample room to maneuver when defining its role in the SCS while at the same time 
testing the extent of U.S. commitment to the region. 
China’s Future Relationship with the International Political System 
At China’s 11th Ambassadorial Conference in July 2009, former Chinese President Hu 
Jintao addressed hundreds of foreign policy professionals on China’s relationship with the 
international political system. In addition to reiterating themes of peaceful development and 
abiding by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mutual respect for territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence), Hu emphasized three points for his audience of party 
officials, diplomats, and practitioners to consider. First, China should increase the role of soft 
power, that is, the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies, in building 
its comprehensive national power.290 Second, foreign policy officials should adopt a more active 
stance in certain areas of foreign affairs. Third, Hu stated the importance of adapting to 
multilateralism in order to promote Chinese interests.291  
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These three points reflect the Chinese government’s foreign policy in the international 
political system in the post-2008 era. Hu’s speech notes the continued importance of 
multilateralism to China’s foreign policy approach, but he also directed China to adopt a more 
active approach in select areas of its relationship with the outside world. Furthermore, China’s 
increasing economic influence will co-opt actors into accepting China’s policies. Despite 
growing activism in China’s strategy, the Chinese government is aware that its foreign policy 
approach is framed by American hegemony, and an overall relationship with the United States 
that, if disrupted, would be harmful to both countries. The institutionalization of Sino-U.S. 
economic ties has formed a symbiotic relationship between the two countries. Another speech by 
Hu in 2011 supports this point. Titled “Building a China-U.S. Cooperative Partnership Based on 
Mutual Respect and Mutual Benefit” and delivered in the United States, the speech first 
enunciated the broad common interests of each country, from upholding peace and stability to 
pursuing the development of the Asian-Pacific region and strengthening diplomatic cooperation. 
Building on these points, Hu continued by stating that the United States and China are different 
in history, culture, social systems and level of development, and therefore, it is not abnormal for 
the U.S. and China to have disagreements. Commenting on these disagreements, Hu emphasized 
that the two countries should respect their distinct interests and handle sensitive issues in a 
proper manner. China has an interest in managing disputes on equal footing with the United 
States, rather than being leveraged by American hegemony. Despite disagreement, Hu concluded 
his speech by asserting that China “does not pose a military threat to any country” and “will 
never seek hegemony or pursue an expansionist policy.292  
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Despite a turnover in leadership from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping in 2013, I argue that there 
is continuity in the Chinese government’s overall strategy to influence the development of a 
multipolar world while pursuing domestic development. Even though China’s capacities as a 
rising power are increasing, the foundation of Xi’s policy approach, like Hu’s, is rooted in 
Deng’s strategy for international affairs. In 2012, Xi stated that the world is more interdependent 
and interconnected, and that there is a trend towards multipolarism and economic globalization. 
In keeping with this trend, Xi announced that the United States and China are exploring a new 
type of relationship between major powers based on “win-win cooperation and mutual respect” 
that will be a “pioneering effort in the history of international relations”.293 While the U.S and 
China, and the international community more broadly, have shared interests, Xi went on to 
encourage all countries to “see each other's strategic intentions objectively and rationally, respect 
each other's interests and concerns, and strengthen coordination and cooperation on regional and 
international issues”. 294 Based on this criterion, it should be expected that China will take a firm 
stance on its strategic considerations while abiding by the same practices it preaches to control 
and manage differences. All elements of China’s strategy stem from prioritizing its long-term 
development to achieve its security objectives and deal with domestic challenges. Maintaining 
conditions favorable to economic development is at the core of China’s foreign policy approach.  
At the Asian Annual Conference for 2015 held at the Baao Forum, Xi outlined the 
trajectory of China’s economic strategy and the security conditions that the country seeks to 
maintain into the future. These two critical points from President Xi’s statement provides a 
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means to thinking about China’s future relationship with the international political system. As Xi 
states, 
In the coming five years, China will import more than US$10 trillion of goods, Chinese 
investment abroad will exceed US$500 billion, and more than 500 million outbound 
visits will be made by Chinese tourists. China will stick to its basic state policy of 
opening up, improve its investment climate, and protect the lawful rights and interests of 
investors. What China needs most is a harmonious and stable domestic environment and 
a peaceful and tranquil international environment…turbulence or war runs against the 
fundamental interests of the Chinese people.295 
Xi’s equal emphasis on development and security guiding China’s foreign policy resonates 
heavily with the architecture of the international political system described by Ikenberry. In the 
same speech, Xi’s closing remark that “history has taught us no country who has tried to achieve 
its goals with force ever succeeded” reveals that, from the Chinese perspective, great power 
politics have advanced beyond the reality proclaimed by the spoiler scenario. A continuation in 
the strategies of Hu and Xi’s highlights that the Chinese government is working within the 
multilateral structure of the world, reinforcing the evidence from the second school of thought 
uncovered in the WTO and SCS case studies. Although China will defend the role of the state in 
mediating China’s relationship with the global economy, it will continue to reform its economic 
structure to meet market standards of the international trading system. And, while Xi Jinping has 
expressed that China will actively defend its sovereignty in the South China Sea, this reflects a 
continuation of Hu Jintao’s policy advice in 2009 to take a more active stance on some aspects of 
China’s foreign policy. As Liao notes, “The linchpin of Chinese foreign policy making is 
maintaining the integrity of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Any 
multilateral principle in China’s diplomacy should be subordinate to this rule of thumb”.296 
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While the assumptions of the supporter scenario are the most relevant for identifying the 
trajectory of China’s rise, this dominant consideration in Chinese foreign policy will also cause 
aspects of the shirker scenario to manifest itself when China’s interests influence it to contradict 
the legitimacy of select international norms that challenge its strategic approach to the 
international political system. In describing the interests of countries, Xi quoted the Chinese 
philosopher, Mencius, in saying that “things are born to be different”, but as the Chinese 
president emphasized to the Obama Administration in 2014, China has a desire to effectively 
control and manage these differences.297 In response, Obama remarked to the press that, in an 
effort to narrow their disagreements, Xi has been frank and open in discussing the issues between 
the two countries.298 The shirker scenario overlooks aspects of conflict management and 
cooperation on the international stage. Chinese officials express an understanding of the dynamic 
of international politics, which indicates that the cooperative stability of the supporter scenario is 
likely to persist in the long term. While the United States will retain its global influence, the age 
of unipolarity is in decline. Active dispute management between the U.S. and a rising China 
suggests that, in the future, the divergent interests of major countries will negotiate the 
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